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INTRODUCTION'

N an era when the adventures of corporate raiders and the mis-

.adventures of corporate managers have received widespread
(frequently unflattering) attention, it was perhaps inevitable that
Congress would pass legislation affecting two of the most widelypublicized phenomena associated with corporate takeover attempts: greenmail and golden parachute payments.2 In an era
when major tax legislation has become an almost annual event, 3 it
was perhaps also inevitable that Congress would deal with greenmail and golden parachutes through the Internal Revenue Code
(the Code). Nevertheless, it was unfortunate that Congress used
the tax law to address the issues raised by greenmail and parachute arrangements. As a matter of tax policy, the Code provisions pertaining to greenmail and golden parachutes-sections
280G, 4999 and 5881-are not defensible additions to the tax
1. A number of individuals commented on drafts of this article and deserve
my thanks for their observations: My colleagues at the Benjamin N. Cardozo
School of Law of Yeshiva University, Professors James B. Lewis, Elliott J. Weiss
and Stewart Sterk; Mr. Robert Willens, Senior Vice-President of Shearson,
Lehman, Hutton; Stephen L. Saltzman, Esq., of Brenner, Saltzman, Wallman
and Goldman, New Haven, Connecticut; Professor Eric M. Zolt of the School of
Law of the University of California at Los Angeles; Professor Ljubomir Nacev of
the Salmon P. Chase College of Law of Northern Kentucky University; and my
most affectionate critic, Doris Zelinsky. I also benefitted from the support of
Cardozo Law School's Samuel and Ronnie Heyman Center on Corporate
Governance and from the research assistance of Gregg Fishman of the class of
1989 of Cardozo Law School.
2. At an elementary level, "greenmail" is defined as payments to corporate
raiders by target management to induce the raiders to refrain from pursuing
their interests in ongoing or threatened takeover attempts. Dennis, Two-Tiered
Tender Offers and Greenmail: Is New Legislation Needed?, 19 GA. L. REV. 281, 282
(1985). At a basic level, "golden parachutes" are defined as excessive severance
payments to former employees. Comment, Future Executive Bailouts: Will Golden
ParachutesFill the American Business Skies?, 14 TEX. TECH. L. REV. 615, 616 (1983).
For a sampling of journalistic coverage of the greenmail and golden parachute issues, see Zweig, New Trickfor Greenmailers, FORBES, Oct. 30, 1989, at 110;
Executive Payoffs, 157 FIN. WORLD 28 (1988); Winkler, Ten Primerica Executives'
ParachutesGilded in $98.2 Million Severance Pact, Wall St.J., Nov. 29, 1988, at A10;
Lewin, Suits Aimed At Greenmail, N.Y. Times, Mar. 3, 1987, at D2, col. 1; Nash,
Calls Mount for Curbs on Markets, N.Y. Times, Feb. 14, 1987, at 33, col. 2; Fight
Corporate Raiders Two Ways, N.Y. Times, Feb. 13, 1987, at A34; Takeovers Yes, HoldUps No, N.Y. Times, Nov. 28, 1986, at A30; Williams, Business Says 'Stop' to the
Raiders, N.Y. Times, Apr. 14, 1985, § 3, at 1; Baker, Modern Dreams of Glory, N.Y.
Times, Feb. 20, 1985, at A23.
3. Within the last three years, Congress has passed the Tax Reform Act,
Pub. L. No. 99-514, 100 Stat. 2085 (1986), the Superfund Revenue Act, Pub. L.
No. 99-499, 100 Stat. 1613 (1986), the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act,
Pub. L. No. 99-509, 100 Stat. 1874 (1986), the Revenue Act, Pub. L. No. 100203, 101 Stat. 1330-382 (1987), and the Technical and Miscellaneous Revenue
Act, Pub. L. No. 100-647, 102 Stat. 3343 (1988).
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I reach this conclusion from an agnostic view of the merits
and disadvantages of greenmail and golden parachutes. Whether
one begins from a benign characterization of these arrangements
or from a condemnatory perspective on greenmail and golden
parachutes, sections 280G, 4999 and 5881 do not withstand scrutiny. The Internal Revenue Code was not the place for Congress
to have voiced its sentiments on greenmail and golden parachute
arrangements.
I will first explore the background against which Congress
legislated, examining some of the definitional issues associated
with greenmail and parachute payments. 5 I will next discuss the
scholarly and judicial responses which greenmail and golden
parachutes have evoked. 6 I will then outline Congress' reaction
to these arrangements in the form of sections 280G, 4999 and
5881 of the Code in the fourth section of this article. 7 The fifth
section of this article presents the core of my analysis. I will canvass the various tax policy criteria which have developed for identifying appropriate uses of the tax law.8

These criteria include

tests that enjoy widespread support among scholars and commentators, as well as tests with less general acceptance. Sections
280G, 4999 and 5881 fail all of these standards, regardless of
4. All references are to the provisions of the Internal Revenue Code of
1986 as amended through the Technical and Miscellaneous Revenue Act, Pub.
L. No. 100-647, 102 Stat. 3343 (1988) (codified as amended I.R.C. §§ 1-9602
(West 1989)). Section 280G disallows a deduction for any excess parachute payment. A "parachute payment" is any payment in the nature of compensation to
a "disqualified individual" if such payment is contingent on a change in the ownership or control of the corporation. I.R.C. § 280G (West 1989). Section 4999
imposes a 20% tax on such excess parachute payments. Id. § 4999. Section
5881 imposes a 50% tax on any person who receives greenmail. Id. § 5881.
Section 162(k)(1) of the Code disallows most deductions "paid or incurred by a
corporation in connection with the redemption of its stock." Id. § 162(k)(1).
This provision applies to all redemptions, not just those constituting greenmail
payments. Accordingly, § 162(k)(1) has generally not been viewed as a companion provision of § 5881 and is not discussed in this article. I will also not discuss
§§ 275(a)(6) and 3121(v)(2). Section 275(a)(6) makes the levies imposed on
golden parachute payments (§ 4999) and greenmail (§ 5881) nondeductible for
income tax purposes. Id. § 275(a)(6). Section 3121(v)(2) affects the treatment
of excess parachute payments for social security payroll tax purposes. Id.
§ 3121(v)(2).
5. See infra notes 10-50 and accompanying text.
6. For a discussion of scholarly debate of these issues, see infra notes 51125 and accompanying text.
7. See infra notes 126-58 and accompanying text.
8. See infra notes 159-212 and accompanying text.
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one's substantive view as to the desirability or impropriety of
greenmail and golden parachute arrangements.
In the sixth section, I argue that the Code provisions concerning greenmail and golden parachutes cannot be dismissed as
harmless mistakes. 9 Rather, they embody a serious misuse of the
Code, imposing unnecessary costs on the administration of the
federal tax system at a time when the system can ill-afford such
costs. The misuse of the Code as exemplified by sections 280G,
4999 and 5881 also makes Congress' process less accountable
and less expert. In the final section of this article, I suggest that
opponents of greenmail and golden parachute payments, even if
totally indifferent to the health of the tax law, nevertheless ought
to be uncomfortable with sections 280G, 4999 and 5881. These
provisions may come to be viewed as preempting the responses of
courts and state legislatures to greenmail and parachute arrangements. If that proves to be the case, sections 280G, 4999 and
5881 will have exacerbated the perceived problems at which they
are aimed.
II.

GREENMAIL AND GOLDEN PARACHUTES:

DEFINITIONAL ISSUES

Of the many phenomena associated with the corporate takeover activity of the 1980s, none has been more controversial than
the arrangements which have come to be identified as greenmail
and golden parachutes. Those opposing greenmail and parachute payments feel they represent the ultimate violation of
shareholders' trust.' 0 Those holding a benign view of these arrangements feel that they are appropriate tools of corporate governance with potentially beneficial results for the particular
corporations involved and for the economy as a whole.' Despite
the attention greenmail and golden parachutes have received, no
definition of either arrangement commands universal acceptance.' 2 For a clear understanding of the scholarly debate concerning the wisdom of greenmail and golden parachutes, an
analysis of the definitional difficulties of each is in order.
9. See infra notes 213-18 and accompanying text.

10. See infra notes 13-16 and accompanying text.
11. See infra notes 51-61 and accompanying text.
12. See Note, Greenmail: Is ItiJust Passingthe Buck?, 6 PACE L. REV. 69, 75-76

(1985) (listing seven sample definitions of greenmail).
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A.

Greenmail Definitional Issues

At its most basic level, the term "greenmail" has come to denote payments to corporate raiders to make such raiders cease
their interests in ongoing or threatened takeover attempts. 13
Typically, greenmail involves the repurchase of the raider's stock
at a premium by the target corporation. However, greenmail may
occur in other guises, such as by permitting raiders to acquire assets from the target corporation on favorable terms or by allowing payments to raiders by a third party (the "white knight")
cooperating with the management of the target corporation.' 4
Beyond these basics, the label "greenmail" raises several definitional issues: the good faith vel non of management making the
payment, the prior involvement of the raider in the target corporation, the availability of the alleged greenmail payments to
shareholders besides the raider and the identification of the premium paid to the raider.
For some opponents of greenmail, the essence of the perceived evil is corporate management's bad faith.' 5 Greenmail, in
this view, is the use of corporate assets to entrench current management's incumbency. The raider is paid shareholders' assets,
not for the shareholders' benefit, but to protect the jobs of those
presently in control of the target corporation.' 6
13. See Dennis, supra note 2, at 282 ("target management may buy out the
... [raider] at a significant premium over the current market price"); Gilson,
Drafting an Effective Greenmail Prohibition, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 329, 329-30 (1988)
(defining greenmail as "target management paying a potential acquirer to go
away by repurchasing his shares at a premium"); Macey & McChesney, A Theoretical Analysis of Corporate Greenmail, 95 YALE L.J. 13, 13 n.1 (1985) (" '[G]reenmail'
... used most often to describe a firm's purchase of its own common stock at a
premium above the current price."); Comment, Greenmail.- Can the Abuses Be
Stopped?, 80 Nw. U.L. REV. 1271, 1274 n.21 (1986) ("Greenmail refers to the
target's repurchase of shares held by a hostile bidder at an above-market
price."); Note, Greenmail: Targeted Stock Repurchases and the Management Entrenchment Hypothesis, 98 HARV. L. REV. 1045, 1045 n.3 (1985) (defining greenmail as
"targeted repurchase of securities at a premium price").
14. For a general background discussion on the subject of greenmail, see
Carney, ControllingManagement Opportunism in the Market for Corporate Control: An
Agency Cost Model, 1988 Wis. L. REV. 385, 397; Dennis, supra note 2; Gilson, supra
note 13; Macey & McChesney, supra note 13; Ruback, An Overview of Takeover
Defenses, in MERGERS & AcQuISITIONs 49, 61 (A. Auerbach ed. 1988); Comment,
supra note 13; Note, supra note 13; Note, supra note 12; Note, The Hobbs Act and
RICO: A Remedy for Greenmail?, 66 TEX. L. REV. 647, 648-50 (1988) [hereinafter
Note, The Hobbs Act and RICO].
15. See Dennis, supra note 2, at 282 ("Arguably, [greenmail] serves to protect the interests of only the current managers of the target."); Gilson, supra note
13, at 330 ("[G]reenmail is just another.., technique by which target management entrenches itself at the expense of target shareholders.").
16. The most important proponent of this view is the Delaware Supreme
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If greenmail is defined as a matter of management's bad
faith, some payments to raiders can be justified by the sincerity of
management's belief that it is acting for the benefit of the shareholders. In particular cases, management indeed might demonstrate that it reasonably believes it better for the shareholders to
buy off a raider rather than to allow him to assume control of the
corporation.
Alternatively, greenmail can be defined in more objective
terms, ignoring the good faith or bad faith of management. In
this view, shareholders are harmed by the payment of premiums
to raiders regardless of the sincerity of management's belief that
it is acting for the shareholders' benefit.17 Moreover, from an evidentiary perspective, it can be argued persuasively that bad faith
ought not be identified as a specific element of greenmail. It is
difficult, the argument suggests, to prove definitively that management is motivated by one concern, such as shareholder welfare, rather than another, such as self-interest.' 8 The possibility
of management self-dealing is obvious and strong in situations
where an unwanted suitor is paid off with corporate assets. Under
this analysis, an irrebuttable presumption that payment is motivated by management's desire to protect itself from the raider's
takeover should attach to any greenmail payment.
The approach to greenmail embodied in section 5881 of the
Code embraces such an objective view. The tax established in
section 5881 is triggered whether or not management acts in
good faith for the benefit of the shareholders. 19
A second definitional issue which arises is the identification
of those deserving to be denoted as "raiders." In one formulation, any shareholder is a raider whenever he threatens management and subsequently terminates his investment in the
Court. That court's decisions proscribe greenmail payments made by management to entrench itself, but permit selective redemptions of stock made in good
faith for the reasonably perceived benefit of the corporation and its shareholders. See, e.g., Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985).
17. See Note, supra note 12, at 73. Greenmail has been criticized as inequitable because the remaining non-threatening shareholders, unlike the raider, do
not receive the benefit of the buyback offer. Id. Also, greenmail heads off the
tender offer process, which prevents shareholders from benefitting from higher
stock market prices during a tender offer. Id. Moreover, greenmail may cause
stock values to drop. Id. at 72-73.
18. Id. at 102-03 (citations omitted).
19. I.R.C. § 5881(a) (West 1989). This section states: "There is hereby
imposed on any person who receives greenmail a tax equal to 50 percent of gain
or other income of such person by reason of such receipt." Id.
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corporation at a premium. 20 From this perspective, the harm to
the remaining shareholders stems from the fact of payment to the
raider at a premium. That harm is not mitigated by any prior,
long-term involvement in the corporation by the greenmail
recipient.
Under an alternative view, the label "raider" should only attach to shareholders who acquire their stock for the purpose of
challenging management or who hold their stock for an insufficient period to demonstrate concern for the long-term welfare of
the corporation. 2' From this perspective, the evil involved in
greenmail emanates from the transient shareholder seeking a
quick profit. A corollary of this view is that payments to dissatisfied, long-term investors fall outside the definition of greenmail.
This latter perspective is reflected in section 5881, which defines
a payment as greenmail only if the recipient has owned his stock
22
for less than twenty-four months.
A third issue in defining greenmail is the matter of selectivity.
Opponents of greenmail typically view it as an assault on fairness
because the premium paid to the raider is not offered to the other
shareholders of the corporation. 23 In this view, the essence of
greenmail is inequity: if all shareholders are given the same terms
as the raider, there is no issue of fairness and no greenmail about
which to complain.
An alternative perspective identifies the harm of greenmail,
not as inequality among shareholders, but as the dismantling of
corporate enterprise. 24 To pay greenmail, corporations must
grudgingly borrow funds or sell assets they otherwise would retain. From this vantage, there is no solace in the availability to all
20. See Gilson, supra note 13, at 340-4 1.

21. Id. at 335. "[A] need to hold an investment subject to market risk for a
significant period of time reduces the likelihood that the investor has an exploitive motive in making the investment by increasing the costs of such a strategy."
Id. "Existing state statutes regulate repurchases involving shares held from two
to three years." Id. at 335 n.16 (citations omitted).
22. I.R.C. § 5881(b)(1) (West 1989). This section states in pertinent part:
"'[G]reenmail' means any consideration transferred by a corporation (or any
person acting in concert with such corporation) to directly or indirectly acquire
stock of such corporation from any shareholder if-(l) such shareholder held
such stock ... for less than 2 years before entering into the agreement to make
the transfer ..
" Id.
23. See Note, supra note 12, at 73.
24. See Comment, supra note 13, at 1306 ("[G]reenmail has substantial
transactions and opportunity costs to the market in general because significant
resources are required to make greenmail payments."); see also Note, The Hobbs
Act and Rico, supra note 14, at 650 ("single greenmail payment often involves
millions of dollars") (footnote omitted).
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shareholders of the opportunity to be redeemed at the same premium as the raider. While such an opportunity serves the claims
of shareholder equity, it actually compounds the economic effects
of paying the raider by forcing the corporation to acquire more
debt or sell more assets to redeem the shares of other shareholders in addition to those of the raider. The net result, according to
this view, is a weakening of the paying corporation.
The drafters of section 5881 identified the greenmail problem as one of selectivity rather than of corporate dislocation. No
tax is imposed by section 5881 if the same opportunity to be redeemed at a premium is offered to all shareholders. 25
A final definitional issue is the determination of the greenmail premium. As Professor Gilson has observed, the simplest
measure of greenmail is the raider's total gain, that is, the difference between the raider's cost for his stock and the amount he is
ultimately paid for it.26 However, this simple approach will frequently misstate the amount of the greenmail premium. Some of
the gain accruing to the raider may reflect not a premium, but
"'normal" appreciation which happened to occur while the raider
was holding his shares. Similarly, if the market price falls during
the raid, the spread between the raider's cost and the payment he
receives will understate the greenmail premium. 2 7
An alternative is to define the greenmail premium as the difference between the amount paid to the raider for his stock and
the market price which prevailed immediately prior to the raider's
announcement of his interest in the target corporation. 28 From
this vantage, appreciation before the announcement of the takeover attempt reflects routine economic gain with respect to which
the raider is as much entitled as would be any other ordinary investor. The market price at the time of the raider's announcement is therefore the "correct" one. Payments to the raider
25. I.R.C. § 5881(b)(3) (West 1989). This section states in pertinent part:
'[G]reenmail' means any consideration transferred by a corporation to directly
or indirectly acquire stock of such corporation from any shareholder if- . . .
(3) such acquisition is pursuant to an offer which was not made on the same
terms of all shareholders." Id.
26. Gilson, supra note 13, at 340-41 ("[I]f a potential acquirer buys a substantial amount of stock at ten dollars per share, and the company repurchases
*

.

. for fifteen dollars ...

profit is ...

an illegal premium.").

27. Suppose, for example, that the raider buys stock at $5 per share, that
his stock is subsequently redeemed at $7 per share and that the market price at
the time of redemption has fallen to $4 per share. Under such circumstances,
the spread between $7 per share and $5 per share apparently understates the
greenmail premium.
28. Gilson, supra note 13, at 342.
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above that amount, the theory suggests, reflect the raider's takeover effort and, therefore, a greenmail premium.
This definition also has its problems. The price prevailing at
the time of the raider's formal announcement of interest may already reflect the takeover effort as word of the raider's activity
informally develops. The price at the time of the raider's formal
announcement, if already increased by word of the proposed
takeover, will be too high a benchmark from which to measure the
premium paid the raider.
Moreover, normal economic events continue during a takeover attempt. A payment to a raider may reflect, among other
things, an increase in the value of the stock which occurred during the raid but which was unrelated to it. Hence, the difference
between the price at the raider's announcement and the subsequent payment to him may be too large an indicator of greenmail
because some of that spread may reflect appreciation unrelated to
the takeover. Conversely, market trends might be downward. In
that event, the spread between the announcement price and that
prevailing at the time of the subsequent greenmail payment may
underestimate the greenmail premium. At the time of the payment to the raider, the theoretical market price which would have
prevailed in the absence of the raid might be lower than the price
29
at announcement.
In addition, the price of the target corporation's stock at the
time of the raider's announcement of interest may, in retrospect,
have been an "incorrect" one. Frequently, after the payment of
greenmail, the price of the target's stock stabilizes at a point
above the level prevailing when the raider unveiled his takeover
bid. Indeed, the theoretical defense of greenmail is buttressed by
this phenomenon as it suggests that the raider may have brought
the price of the target corporation to its proper, higher level.
The difficulties with the first two definitional approaches suggest a third possible method, defining the greenmail premium as
the difference between the amount paid to the raider and the prevailing price at some point after the raider's stock is redeemed. 3 0
29. Suppose, for example, that the price as of the raider's announcement of
interest is $5 per share, that the raider is bought out at $8 per share and that, in
the absence of the raid, bearish market conditions would have depressed the
price to $3 per share. In this situation, the spread between the $5 price and the
8 price arguably understates the greenmail premium.
30. Gilson, supra note 13, at 345. "The most intriguing part of this approach is that the solution relies on the market to identify greenmail." Id. at

347.
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This theory alleges that the post-takeover price is the "true" one
because it reflects the corporation's long-term value. The excess
over this long-term value is the premium paid as greenmail. Professor Gilson identifies this approach as the most desirable way of
3
determining the greenmail premium. '
The shortcoming of this approach is the inherent arbitrariness in deciding the date after the greenmail payment when the
market price is "correct." The price immediately after the payment to the raider may still reflect the short-term tumult associated with the takeover effort. As time passes, the market price
may be viewed as more reflective of long-term value. On the
other hand, the longer one waits to fix the base price for determining the greenmail premium, the greater the danger becomes
that price will reflect extraneous post-takeover events.
Finally, the greenmail premium can be defined simply as the
difference between the amount paid to the raider and the prevailing market price at the time the raider's stock is redeemed.3 2 This
approach generally understates the premium associated with
greenmail. When the raider and target management come to
terms, some portion of the prevailing market price will reflect
speculation related to the takeover. Consequently, the market
price at the time of the raider's redemption already embodies part
of the greenmail premium because that price reflects the raider's
33
interest in the stock.
Of these four possible approaches, the drafters of section
5881 embraced the first, defining the greenmail premium as the
34
entire gain of the raider.
B.

Golden ParachuteDefinitional Issues

Like greenmail, the concept of the golden parachute raises
numerous definitional issues. 35 At its most basic level, the term
31. See id.at 349.
32. Id. at 338 ("[M]ost common formulation of a greenmail prohibition [is]
the straightforward but .... naive view ....).
33. Id. This approach is criticized as doing no more than setting a ceiling
on the amount of greenmail that can be paid. Id.
34. See I.R.C. § 5881 (West 1989).
35. For background on the subject of golden parachutes, see Carney, supra
note 14, at 421; Riger, On Golden Parachutes-Ripcordsor Ripoffs? Some Comments on
Special Termination Agreements, 3 PACE L. REV. 15 (1982); Subcommittee on Executive Compensation, Executive Compensation: A Road Map for the CorporateAdvisor, 40
Bus. LAw. 219, 348 (1984); Comment, Golden Parachutes: A Perk That Boards
Should Scrutinize Carefully, 67 MARQ. L. REV. 293 (1984); Comment, Testing the
Flight of the Golden Parachute. JudicialSmooth Sailing or Turbulence Ahead?, 11 N. Ky.
L. REV. 519 (1984); Comment, supra note 2; Note, Platinum Parachutes: Who's Pro-

https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol35/iss1/2

10

Zelinsky: Greenmail, Golden Parachutes and the Internal Revenue Code: A Tax
1990]

TAX POLICY CRITIQUE

"golden parachute" has come to mean excessive severance payments to former employees. 3 6 Some would refine the notion by
labelling only those severance arrangements tainted unacceptably
37
by corporate management's self-dealing as golden parachutes.
In this view, the essence of the parachute problem is bad faithmanagement using its control of the corporation to reward itself
excessively.
A corollary of this perspective is that severance payments established by management in good faith should not be denoted as
golden parachutes.3 8 Severance outlays to managers should not
be condemned as parachutes if management can demonstrate
that the payments were undertaken with appropriate consideration for the shareholders' welfare.
Alternatively, good faith can be viewed as irrelevant to the
characterization of a particular arrangement as a golden parachute. 39 From this perspective, management's sincerity does not
change the objectionable nature of the parachute arrangementan excessive outlay made at the shareholders' expense. Or, as is
the case vis-a-vis greenmail, large severance payments may be
viewed as inherently permeated by self-dealing, making it unnecessary to state bad faith as a separate element of the definition of
a golden parachute.
Under sections 280G and 4999 of the Code, excessive severance payments are denoted as parachute outlays whether or not
40
management has acted in good faith.
tecting the Shareholder?, 14 HOFSTRA L. REV. 653 (1986); Note, Golden Parachute
Agreements: Cushioning Executive Bailouts in the Wake of a Tender Offer, 57 ST. JOHN'S
L. REV. 516 (1983); Note, Golden Parachutes: Untanglingthe Ripcords, 39 STAN. L.
REV. 955 (1987); Note, Golden Parachutes: Executive Employment Contracts, 40 WASH.
& LEE L. REV. 1117 (1983); Note, Golden Parachutesand the BusinessJudgment Rule:
Toward a Proper Standard of Review, 94 YALE L.J. 909 (1985).
36. See Comment, supra note 2, at 616.
37. See Note, Platinum Parachutes: Who's Protecting the Shareholder?, supra note
35, at 653 n.2 (giving two definitions which limit golden parachutes as applying
only to "certain key executives" and "high level officials").
38. See Note, Golden Parachutes: Untangling the Ripcords, supra note 35, at 955
("[C]ommentators expect most courts to determine the validity of golden parachute arrangements under . . . the 'business judgment rule' ") (footnote
omitted).
39. See Comment, supra note 2, at 620 ("[S]hareholders are subjected to
unjustifiable costs in return for the promise of a team of 'super management.'
[I]t is virtually impossible for the hapless security holder to ever receive what he
had paid for.").
40. Section 280G(b)(2)(A) defines parachute payment as "any payment,"
and gives no limitations with respect to good faith. I.R.C. § 280G(b)(2)(A)
(West 1989). Section 4999 imposes a tax on "any person who receives an excess
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A second definitional issue is what, if any, events must accompany the departure from employment. We might include all
excessive severance payments in the definition of parachutes. In
this view, a golden parachute exists whenever a manager departs
4
with too much compensation. '
The definition of a golden parachute is commonly restricted
to those severance payments associated with a change of corporate control. 42 Such a change is typically defined by turnover on
the board of directors, a threatened or successful tender offer or
proxy fight, a sale of substantial corporate assets or some other
comparable sign of a takeover attempt. Much of the practitioneroriented literature on golden parachutes is devoted to the identi43
fication of the events constituting a change of control.
Sections 280G 44 and 499945 define excessive severance outlays as parachute payments only if the severance payments are associated with a change of corporate control.
A third definitional issue is the role of shareholder approval.
From one perspective, the opprobrium "golden parachute"
should not attach to severance payments if those payments are
condoned by the shareholders. 46 This argument asserts that the
shareholders' money is the object of concern, and if the shareholders choose to spend their funds for excessive severance out47
lays, that is their prerogative.
parachute payment," and gives no limitation with respect to good faith. Id.
§ 4999.
41. In Demetracopoulos v. Strafford Guidance Center, 130 N.H. 209, 536
A.2d 189 (1987), the New Hampshire Supreme Court used the term "golden
parachute" to refer to a provision in Demetracopoulos' employment contract
which granted him the greater of a year's salary and fringe benefits, or 80% of
the cash equivalent of the remainder of the contract, if he was dismissed, suspended, or demoted. Id. at 212, 536 A.2d at 191.
42. See Comment, supra note 2, at 616.
43. SeeJ. TARRANT, PERKS AND PARACHUTES 187 (1985); Profusek, Executive
Employment Contracts in the Takeover Context, 6 CORP. L. REv. 99, 105 (1983); see also
2 SHARK REPELLENTS AND GOLDEN PARACHUTES: A HANDBOOK FOR THE PRACTITIONER 425 (R. Winter, M. Stumpf & G. Hawkins ed. Supp. 1988).
44. I.R.C. § 280G(b)(2)(A)(i) (West 1989). This section states in relevant
part: "The term 'parachute payment' means any payment in the nature of compensation .. .if-(i) such payment is contingent on a change-(I) in the ownership or effective control of the corporation, or (II) in the ownership of a
substantial portion of the assets of the corporation." Id.
45. Id. § 4999. Section 4999(b) expressly incorporates § 280G(b)'s definition of "excess parachute payment." Id. § 4999(b).
46. See Green & Junewicz, A Reappraisal of Current Regulation of Mergers and
Acquisitions, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 647, 724-26 (1984) (discussing mandatory shareholder approval as prerequisite to upholding corporate defense tactics).
47. Id. at 725.
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An alternative approach holds that shareholder approval cannot make a golden parachute acceptable. 48 This attitude may reflect skepticism about the genuineness of shareholder selfgovernance. This view suggests that, because incumbent management controls the proxy system, shareholder approval of management's compensation should not be taken seriously. A
stronger rationale for disregarding shareholder approval is the
plight of the outvoted stockowner who opposes the golden parachute. While it may be acceptable for the majority to authorize
management's self-dealing as to the majority's money, it is not
appropriate for the majority to countenance self-dealing with the
objecting minority's money. Because parachute payments come
from all shareholders' funds, majority approval is not sufficient to
overcome the minority's interest against management selfdealing.
On the subject of shareholder approval, sections 280G and
4999 distinguish between corporations with and without readily
tradeable stock. 49 In the context of a corporation with tradeable
48. See supra note 46 for a discussion of the criticism of mandatory stockholder approval.
49. Section 208G(b)(5) states:
(A) Notwithstanding paragraph (2), the term "parachute payment"
does not include(i) any payment to a disqualified individual with respect to a corporation which (immediately before the change described in paragraph (2)(A)(i)) was a small business corporation (as denied in
section 1361(b), but without regard to paragraph (1)(C) thereof),
and
(ii) any payment to a disqualified individual with respect to a corporation (other than a corporation described in clause (i)) if(I) immediately before the change described in paragraph
(2)(A)(i), so stock in such corporation was readily tradeable on
an established securities market or otherwise, and
(II) the shareholder approval requirements of subparagraph
(B) are met with respect to such payment.
The Secretary may, by regulations, prescribe that the requirements of
subclause (I) of clause (ii) are not met where a substantial portion of the
assets of any entity consists (directly or indirectly) of stock in such corporation and interests in such other entity are readily tradeable on an
established securities market, or otherwise. Stock described in section
1504(a)(4) shall not be taken into account under clause (ii)(I) if the payment does not adversely affect the shareholder's redemption and liquidation rights.
(B) The shareholder approval requirements of this subparagraph are
met with respect to any payment if(i) such payment was approved by a vote of the persons who
owned, immediately before the change described in paragraph
(2)(A)(i), more than 75 percent of the voting power of all outstanding stock of the corporation, and
(ii) there was adequate disclosure to.shareholders of all material
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stock, section 280G disregards shareholder approval: an outlay
otherwise constituting a parachute payment cannot be rescued by
a shareholder vote. However, in the absence of such stock, section 280G provides that severance compensation is not a parachute payment if approved, after adequate disclosure, by a
50
seventy-five percent shareholder vote.

III.

GREENMAIL AND GOLDEN PARACHUTES:
THEORETICAL ISSUES

A.

Greenmail Theoretical Issues

Once we have defined greenmail and parachute arrangements, the question arises whether anything ought be done about
them. For some commentators, greenmail can be a fairly benign
phenomenon, potentially benefitting shareholders and the economy as a whole. 51 Professors Macey and McChesney, for example, defend greenmail in certain cases relying on the widelyaccepted premise that corporate raiders perform useful economic
functions. 52 Raiders make their profit by locating mismanaged
and poorly-organized firms, and then acquiring such corporations' shares. Raiders' activity informs the market (including the
shareholders and management of the target corporation) that a
particular business will be more profitable if restructured or better managed. The prospect of being identified in this fashion, the
argument continues, disciplines corporate managers to do better
lest they be subject to raiders' attentions.
facts concerning all payments which (but for this paragraph) would
be parachute payments with respect to a disqualified individual.
The regulations prescribed under subsection (c) shall include regulations providing for the application of this subparagraph in the case of
shareholders which are not individuals (including the treatment of nonvoting interests in an entity which is a shareholder) and where an entity
holds a de minimis amount of stock in the corporation.
I.R.C. § 280G(b)(5) (West 1989). Section 4999 adopts the definition of"excessive parachute payment" as contained in § 280G. See id. § 4999(b).
50. Id. § 280G(b)(5)(B). For the text of this section, see supra note 49.
51. See Macey & McChesney, supra note 13, at 17 ("Moreover, the model
illustrates that payment of greenmail may improve the functioning of the market
for corporate control and enhance economic efficiency."); see also Macey, Takeover Defense Tactics and Legal Scholarship: Market Forces Versus the Policymaker's Dilemma, 96 YALE L.J. 342, 344 (1986) (discussing how shareholders might on
average benefit from payment of greenmail); McChesney, Assumptions, Empirical
Evidence and Social Science Method, 96 YALE L.J. 339, 340 (1986) ("[M]any firms
have in fact benefitted from raiders who buy into a firm only to be greenmailed
off.").
52. For a discussion of useful economic functions of corporate raiders, see
Macey & McChesney, supra note 13, at 16-28.

https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol35/iss1/2

14

Zelinsky: Greenmail, Golden Parachutes and the Internal Revenue Code: A Tax

1990]

TAx POLICY CRITIQUE

However, Professors Macey and McChesney advise that the
raider who has identified an undervalued firm may not be the best
ultimate owner of that business.5 3 There may be a third party
who, once informed by the raider's activity, will manage the
newly-discovered business better than the raider or who will
restructure the newly-identified firm more profitably than could
the raider. Shareholders of the target corporation would rather
sell to this third party than to the original raider since the third
party, expecting to make the firm more profitable than the raider,
will pay more to the target's shareholders.
It thus may be appropriate in some settings to pay greenmail
to make the original raider depart. The profit from greenmail rewards the raider for locating the undervalued firm and encourages him and others to canvass the market for other corporations
similarly in need of better management or restructuring. The
corporation located by the raider passes into the hands of a third
party who can derive the greatest value from it. And the stockholders of the target corporation realize the greatest amount for
their shares since they sell to the highest bidder, the third party
alerted by the raider's activity.
In a similar vein, Professor Dennis believes that "the practice
of greenmail should be allowed to continue." 54 A raider's acquisition of the stock of a target corporation, he maintains, "creates
' 55
significant new information and facilitates control transactions.
Professor Dennis concludes that "[t]he ability of target management to enter into greenmail transactions makes" such acquisitions "more likely, and, thus, the community of shareholders
56
gain."
Professor Booth suggests that while greenmail "raises serious questions of fairness" among shareholders, it "may not be as
great an abuse as is generally thought. '5 7 The raider's acquisition of stock, he observes, usually causes the market price to
rise. 58 This generates gain for the "shareholders most willing to
sell," those who profit from the raider's interest by disposing of
53. Macey & McChesney, supra note 13, at 18-19 (value of firm will be
greater if control is placed in hands of current minority, new minority or third
party).
54. Dennis, supra note 2, at 284.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Booth, Management Buyouts, Shareholder Welfare and the Limits of Fiduciary
Duty, 60 N.Y.U. L. REV. 630, 662-63 (1985).
58. Id. at 663.
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their stock in a rising market. 59 The raider's fellow shareholders
may prefer to redeem the raider at a premium, rather than permitting him to gain control. In Professor Booth's words,
"[g]reenmail may serve the interests of holdout shareholders if
they stand to lose more by a transfer of control than the premium
they must pay" 60 to the raider. "As a counterbalance to management's discretion to propose a buyout," he observes, "greenmail
6
can be viewed as beneficial rather than abusive." '
Other legal commentators have viewed greenmail less favorably, arguing that greenmail is unfair to the shareholders who do
62
not receive it, and that greenmail is economically unjustified.
Professors Gordon and Kornhauser, for example, argue that the
Macey-McCheseny scenario is "highly unlikely" and that, consequently, greenmail deserves condemnation as it "leads, in the aggregate, to shareholder welfare losses." 63 Similarly, Professor
Coffee criticizes greenmail as an entrenching tactic used by management of the target corporation to inappropriately perpetuate
itself.64 Greenmail, he writes, "short-circuits the control contest"
started by the raider, leaving existing management in place. 6 5 In
such cases, the "discipline of the takeover has been thwarted by
the repurchase" of the raider's stock, a premature resolution of
the takeover which leaves in place the target's managers. 6 6 Professor Karjala concludes that "[g]reenmail can and should be
67
prohibited."
Among anti-greenmail commentators, however, there is significant disagreement as to the appropriate remedy. Professor
Oesterle suggests that the courts are capable of handling green59. Id.
60. Booth, The Promise of State Takeover Statutes, 86 MICH. L. REv. 1635, 1662
(1988).
61. Booth, supra note 57, at 663.
62. See Gordon & Kornhauser, Takeover Defense Tactics, 96 YALE L.J. 295, 297
(1986) ("[T]arget stock buybacks are unlikely to increase shareholder wealth as a
general matter and, on a shareholder wealth criterion, should not be permitted
as a defensive tactic.").
63. Id. at 320.
64. Coffee, Regulating the Market for Corporate Control: A Critical Assessment of
the Tender Offer's Role in Corporate Governance, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 1145, 1293
(1984).
65. Id. at 1290.
66. Id. at 1292. For other anti-greenmail commentary, see Greene &
Junewicz, supra note 46, at 706-32; Lipton, Corporate Governance in the Age of Finance Corporatism, 136 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 31, 65 (1987); Note, DiscriminationAgainst
Shareholders in Opposing a Hostile Takeover, 59 S. CAL. L. REV. 1319, 1336 (1986).
67. Karjala, Federalism,Full Disclosure, and the National Markets in the Interpretation of Federal Securities Law, 80 Nw. U.L. REV. 1473, 1503 n.126 (1986).
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mail cases under existing corporate law doctrines. 68 Similarly,
Professor Karjala believes that greenmail ought to be blocked by
courts implementing "fiduciary duty considerations. ' 69 Others,
skeptical ofjudicial decisionmaking in this area, would require the
prior approval of the corporation's shareholders before greenmail could be paid. 70 For example, the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC) Advisory Committee on Tender Offers would
prohibit the payment of greenmail to any person owning stock
less than two years unless the other shareholders approve. 7 1 Yet
a third approach is a statutory or regulatory prohibition on greenmail. 7 2 Professor Weiss, embracing this alternative, would, in
connection with a federal law on takeovers, forbid greenmail
73
statutorily.
Not surprisingly, most of the litigation to date concerning
greenmail has occurred in the Delaware courts or has applied
Delaware law. In the leading decision, Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co.,74 the Delaware Supreme Court proscribed greenmail
motivated by management's desire to entrench itself while it condoned greenmail paid with the intent to protect corporate policy. 75 In the court's words:
[T]he principle of selective stock repurchases by a
Delaware corporation is neither unknown nor
unauthorized....
...If the board of directors is disinterested, has acted in good faith and with due care, its decision in the
absence of an abuse of discretion will be upheld as a
68. Oesterle, The Negotiation Model of Tender Offer Defenses and The Delaware
CORNELL L. REV. 117, 134 n.69 (1986).
69. Karjala, supra note 67, at 1502.
70. For a discussion of the effect of shareholder approval, see supra notes
46-50 and accompanying text.
71. See Takeover Tactics and PublicPolicy: Hearings Before the House Subcommittee
on Telecommunications, Consumer Protection, and Finance, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 43
(1984) [hereinafter Hearings] (statement of SEC Chairman John S.R. Shad), reprinted in [1983-1984 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 83,511. Recommendation 43 of the recommendations of the SEC's Advisory Committee on
Tender Offers states that shareholder approval be required for repurchase of a
company's shares at a premium from a holder who has held the shares for less
than two years. Id. at 86,683.
72. See Weiss, A Proposalfora Federal Takeover Law, 9 CARDOZO L. REV. 1699,
1701 (1988).
73. Id.
74. 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985).
75. Id. at 955.

Supreme Court, 72
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proper exercise of business judgment. 76
It is also not surprising that the greenmail passing judicial
muster has involved the payment of relatively small premiums. In
Polk v. Good, 77 for example, the Delaware Supreme Court, applying the Unocal standard, approved a settlement with reference to
78
Texaco's purchase of Texaco stock owned by the Bass interests.
The challenged redemption was characterized by the court as reflecting "a premium of approximately 3% over market." 79 This,
the court concluded, "seems reasonable in relation to the immediate disruptive effect and the potential long-term threat which
the Bass group posed" to Texaco. 80
In contrast, greenmail involving larger premiums has met
with unfavorable judicial response. Both Heckmann v. Ahmanson, 8
which involved Walt Disney Production's redemption of Disney
stock owned by the Steinberg interests, and Fry v. Trump, 8 2 which
involved payments by Bally Manufacturing Company to Donald
Trump in redemption of Trump's Bally stock, illustrate judicial
hostility towards greenmail involving large premiums. In
Heckmann, the court affirmed a preliminary injunction granted to
the complaining shareholders, holding that the shareholders had
"established a reasonable probability of proving [that] breach of
fiduciary duties" had occurred. 83 Central to the court's conclusion was its observation that the Steinberg interests were bought
out at "a price 50 percent above the market price following the
[buy out] transaction." 8 4 In Fry, the plaintiffs characterized the
premium received by Trump as "over 20%."85 In response to

Trump's motion to dismiss, the court concluded that the plaintiffs
had stated various causes of action against Trump and the Bally
8 6
directors.
B.

Golden Parachute Theoretical Issues

Unlike greenmail, courts and commentators have generally
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.

Id. at 957 (citations omitted).
507 A.2d 531 (Del. 1986).
Id.at 539.
Id. at 537.
Id.
168 Cal. App. 3d 119, 214 Cal. Rptr. 177 (1985).
681 F. Supp. 252 (D.N.J. 1988).
Heckmann, 168 Cal. App. 3d at 123, 214 Cal. Rptr. at 180-81.
Id. at 125, 214 Cal. Rptr. at 181.
Fry, 681 F. Supp. at 255.
Id.
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recognized that particular golden parachutes may be justified. 87
That recognition has been coupled with a sensitivity to the possibilities of management self-dealing. The most common defense
of golden parachutes is that they minimize the conflict of interests
between shareholders and managers when a corporation is the
target of a takeover effort. This view suggests that corporate
managers can more objectively evaluate takeover proposals if
managers are assured that a takeover will not harm them individually. Freed by generous severance arrangements from anxiety
about their own economic welfare, managers will be able to recommend their own displacement in favor of the raider if such displacement is in the shareholders' best interests. More basically,
defenders of parachute arrangements contend that in an environment distinguished by significant takeover activity, it is difficult or
impossible to recruit and retain quality managers without ex88
tending to them the protections of golden parachutes.
In this vein, Professor Coffee suggests that golden
parachutes make explicit corporations' previously implicit
promises to management of security and deferred compensation. 89 In a quiescent corporate environment, he suggests, management enforced these implicit promises through its de facto
control of the board of directors. Given the prevalence of corporate takeovers, managers can no longer rely on their control of
the board to enforce the corporation's implied promises. Professor Coffee concludes that this creates the need for explicit contractual assurances to management of job security and deferred
compensation, such as golden parachutes. 90 Therefore, there is
"legitimacy" to "some form of severance compensation" for corporate managers as well as "potential for abuse" in such
arrangements .9
Professor Williamson's analysis of golden parachutes starts
with the distinction between management skills that are firm-spe87. See Note, supra note 35, at 914 (golden parachutes which facilitate riskshifting should be upheld).
88. See id. at 917 ("Golden parachutes are also useful in providing longterm incentives for executives to enter industries in which the potential displacement losses from takeovers are above average.").
89. Coffee, Shareholders Versus Managers: The Strain in the Corporate Web, 85
MICH. L. REV. 75-76 (1986).
90. Id. at 76. For an economist's effort to examine empirically a contractual
explanation for golden parachutes, see Knoeber, Golden Parachutes, Shark Repellants, and Hostile Tender Offers, 76 AM. EcoN. REV. 155 (1986).
91. Coffee, supra note 64, at 1264.

Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1990

19

Villanova Law Review, Vol. 35, Iss. 1 [1990], Art. 2

150

VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 35: p. 131

cific and those of general applicability. 9 2 Without assurances of
continuing employment, in his view, an executive will be reluctant
to devote his career to the acquisition of skills useful only to a
single employer. Golden parachutes permit managers to narrow
the range of their employability by assuring them of generous
severance compensation if anything happens to their relationship
with the particular firm to which they have adapted their skills.
Professor Williamson consequently views golden parachutes as
93
appropriate for executives asked to develop firm-specific skills.
He is, however, skeptical of such arrangements for managers with
more generalized human capital because such managers can be
more easily employed by a wide number of firms in the event of a
94
takeover.
Professor Fischel also believes golden parachutes "may be
beneficial in particular cases" to encourage managers to acquire
"firm-specific skills." 9 5 Judge Posner has labelled golden
parachutes one of the more "innocent" responses to a takeover
threat.9 6 Such arrangements, he notes, may benefit shareholders
"by reducing managers' opposition to a takeover."9 7 To Professor Macey, "[t]he value of golden parachutes is clear." 9 8 Such
arrangements "reduce the conflict of interest between shareholders and managers during takeovers." 9 9 Parachutes also properly
''compensate managers for the possibility that they will lose their
00
jobs through corporate restructuring."'
To the detractors of golden parachutes, such arrangements
are merely exercises in self-dealing by management.' 0 ' This perception is reinforced by instances of multimillion dollar severance
payments hastily adopted in the middle of takeover fights. For
some opposing golden parachutes, the management objectivity
92. Williamson, Corporate Governance, 93 YALE L.J. 1197, 1216 (1984).
93. Id.
94. Id. at 1218 n.63; see also 0. WILLIAMSON, THE ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS
OF CAPITALISM 314-16 (1985).
95. Fischel, Organized Exchanges and the Regulation of Dual Class Common Stock,

54 U. CI. L. REV. 119, 137-38 (1987).
96. Posner, Law and the Theory of Finance: Some Intersections, 54 GEO. WASH. L.
REV. 159, 166 (1986).

97. Id.
98. See Macey, Externalities, Firm Specific Capital Investments, and the Legal Treatment of Fundamental Corporate Changes, 1989 DUKE L.J. 173, 186.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 187.
101. For a discussion of the issue of the good faith of directors, and
whether good faith is relevant in defining "parachute payments," see supra notes
15-19 and accompanying text.
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allegedly assured by such arrangements is more properly viewed
as the creation of perverse incentives for managers confronted
with a takeover threat.' 0 2 How, they ask, can managers objectively assess a takeover proposal or defend shareholders' interests
when managers will make an exorbitant amount of money if they
arrange to have themselves fired? Others have suggested that
golden parachutes are an improper defensive tactic used by target
management to entrench itself by making a takeover more costly.
In this spirit, Professor Riger is highly critical of parachute
arrangements, dismissing them as "parting gift[s] of corporate
moneys without support in contract or corporate law."' 0 3 As to
the various defenses of golden parachutes, he concludes, there is
a "total lack of merit."' 10 4 Professor Gilson is among those troubled by the "perverse incentive[s]" created by golden
parachutes. 0 5 Professor Leebron similarly believes that such arrangements make target management less inclined to bargain
over takeover terms.' 0 6 "Thus," he writes, "one could expect
golden parachutes to lead not only to less frequent management
opposition, but also to lower" prices for shareholders of the acquired corporation. 10 7 Professor Rosenzweig agrees that golden
parachutes reduce managers' incentives to conduct a vigorous
auction of the target corporation so as to maximize the price received by the target's shareholders. 0 8
Just as commentators believe different remedies are appropriate in the greenmail context, opinion is divided as to the
proper response to golden parachutes. Professor Oesterle believes existing doctrine adequate for the courts to police golden
parachutes on a case-by-case basis, separating those permeated
by self-dealing from those undertaken with appropriate concern
for shareholders' welfare.' 0 9 Professor Coffee, in contrast, believes "a vague fiduciary standard" for golden parachutes "seems
likely to produce much litigation and doubt, but little clear gui102. For the views of Professors Gilson, Leebron, and Rosenweig, see infra
notes 105-08 and accompanying text.
103. Riger, supra note 35, at 39.
104. Id.
105. Gilson, Value Creation by Business Lawyers: Legal Skills and Asset Pricing,94
YALE L.J. 239, 285 n.114 (1984).
106. Leebron, Games CorporationsPlay: A Theory of Tender Offers, 61 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 153, 183 n.105 (1986).
107. Id.
108. Rosenzweig, Target Litigation, 85 MICH. L. REV. 110, 149 n.192 (1986).
109. Oesterle, Target Managers as NegotiatingAgents, 71 CORNELL L. REV. 53,
93 n.134 (1983).
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dance or constraint." ' 10 To create a bright line, he would subject
all severance arrangements to shareholder approval "above some
reasonable level (say, one year's compensation)." 1 1' In a similar
vein, Professor Siegel would require shareholder approval for any
defensive tactic, including golden parachutes. 1 2 The recommendations of the SEC Advisory Committee reflect a third approach,
a legislative or regulatory response.' 13 The committee would
prohibit the issuance of any golden parachutes once a tender offer has commenced. 1 4 The SEC itself similarly favors a legislative ban on the creation or amendment of officers' and directors'
compensation agreements during tender offers." 5 Professor
Weiss also favors prohibiting golden parachutes legislatively." 16
In the leading decision to date, Koenings v. Joseph Schlitz Brewing Co. ,117 the Wisconsin Supreme Court concluded that golden
parachutes can be analyzed within existing contract doctrines. In
the court's words: "[T]he term 'golden parachute' is not by itself
legally significant, nor is it legally conclusive. It is merely descriptive of a certain type of employment contract given to top corporate executives and triggered by a change of corporate
control."' 18
The precise issue addressed in Koenings was the reasonability,
and therefore enforceability, of the stipulated damages clause of
the parachute agreement. In upholding the stipulated damages
provision as reasonable, the court stressed the employer's need
"to quell the fears of its employees that they may lose their jobs
110. See Coffee, supra note 64, at 1264.
111. Id.
112. Siegel, Tender Offer Defensive Tactics: A Proposalfor Reform, 36 HASTINGS
L.J. 377, 417 (1985).
113. See Hearings, supra note 71, at 86,682 (advisory committee recommendation 38 deals with golden parachute arrangements after commencement of
tender offer).
114. Id. The committee would also require advisory shareholder votes as
to golden parachutes adopted when no tender offer is pending. Id.
115. See Tender Offer Reform Act of 1984, [1984 Transfer Binder] Fed.
Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 83,630. The position of the SEC is not precisely the same
as that of the advisory committee. The SEC does not favor advisory shareholder
votes. Moreover, the SEC, for purposes of proposed legislation, would define
all officers' and directors' compensation arrangements as golden parachutes
whether or not dependent on a change of control. The committee defined parachute arrangements as those compensatory arrangements triggered by a change
of control. Id.
116. Weiss, supra note 72, at 1730.
117. 126 Wis. 2d 349, 377 N.W.2d 593 (1985); see Note, Koenings v.Joseph
Schlitz Brewing Co.: The Wisconsin Supreme Court Addresses Executive Termination
Benefits in a Golden Parachute Contract, 1987 Wis. L. REV. 823.
118. Koenings, 126 Wis. 2d at 360, 377 N.W.2d at 599.
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should a takeover occur." ' 1 9 Similarly, in InternationalInsurance
Co. v. Johns,' 20 the district court, applying Florida law, upheld parachute arrangements designed to retain "a talented management
group" during a takeover. 12' In response to the claim that the
parachutes wasted corporate assets, the circuit court affirmed and
held the arrangements, approved by "a disinterested board" and
a majority of the corporation's shareholders, to be protected by
the business judgment rule. 122 Moreover, in Buckhorn, Inc. v.
Ropak Corp.,1 2 3 the court, applying Delaware law, held that severance payments extended to management as golden parachutes
passed muster under Unocal, but that stock options extended as
24
parachutes did not.
Permeating all discussion of greenmail and golden
parachutes is the overarching issue of federalism. The concern is
the extent to which matters such as greenmail and golden
parachutes ought be left to state regulation as part of the states'
traditional primacy in matters of corporate law. The argument
for state regulation is ultimately an appeal for decentralized decision making and for experimentation with alternative legal
schemes. On the other hand, advocates of federal standards believe that, given the mobility of corporations among states, the
weakest state rule will eventually become the national norm. 2 5
In adopting sections 280G, 4999 and 5881, Congress came
down firmly on the side of federal regulation.
IV.

SECTIONS

280G, 4999 AND 5881: AN OUTLINE

The Revenue Act of 1987 added section 5881 to the Internal
Revenue Code, and the Technical and Miscellaneous Revenue
Act of 1988 amended that section. 126 Section 5881 imposes a
119. Id. at 369, 377 N.W.2d at 603.
120. 685 F. Supp. 1230 (S.D. Fla. 1988), aff'd, 874 F.2d 1447 (11th Cir.
1989).

121. Id. at 1239.
122. InternationalInsurance, 874 F.2d at 1460-61.
123. 656 F. Supp. 209 (S.D. Ohio), aff'd without published opinion, 815 F.2d
76 (6th Cir. 1987).
124. Id. at 232-33.
125. For discussion of federalism concerns in this area, see Fischel, supra
note 95; Karjala, supra note 67; Weiss, supra note 72; Symposium: The Forces Shaping CorporateLaw: A Look to the Future, 8 CARDOZO L. REV. 657 (1987); Symposium:
State CorporateAnti-Takeover Legislation, 8 N. ILL. U.L. REV. 197 (1988); Symposium:
Regulating Corporate Takeovers, 57 U. CIN. L. REV. 455 (1988).
126. See also Moore & Schuck, Tax Aspects of Defensive Strategies to Corporate
Takeovers, 69J. TAX'N 212, 214 (1988). For further background on § 5881, see
Lustig, The Emerging Role of the Federal Tax Law in Regulating Hostile Corporate Take-
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separate, additional tax of fifty percent upon the "gain or other
income" realized by the recipient of a greenmail payment. 27 In
light of current maximum effective income tax rates approaching
forty percent, 28 section 5881 can result in the cumulative taxation of greenmail at a rate of almost ninety percent. 12 9 Even if
greenmail takes a form which is tax-free under normal income tax
rules, the fifty-percent levy of section 5881 applies. 3 0 If, for example, greenmail is paid through a stock-for-stock exchange, taxfree under section 368, section 5881 nevertheless imposes its
fifty-percent tax on the difference between the fair market value
of the stock paid as greenmail and the basis of the greenmail recipient in the stock surrendered by him.
For purposes of section 5881, a payment to a shareholder
constitutes greenmail if three criteria are satisfied. First, at the
time of the agreement to make the payment, the greenmailer
must have owned his stock for less than two years. 13' This aspect
of section 5881 reflects the perception of the greenmail problem
as one of excess payments to transient investors. If a shareholder
has held his stock for at least twenty-four months, section 5881
does not impose its fifty-percent levy.
Second, section 5881 applies only if the greenmailer, or a
person related to or "acting in concert" with him, made or
threatened a tender offer requiring registration with the SEC or
with a state securities authority.' 3 2 This provision reenforces the
over Defenses: The New Section 5881 Excise Tax on Greenmail, 40 U. FLA. L. REV. 789
(1988).

127. I.R.C. § 5881(a) (West 1989).
128. For corporations, the five-percent surcharge of § 11 (b) can result in an
effective tax rate of 39% on some income.
129. Adding regular income tax liability, as discussed in supra note 128, to
the tax imposed by § 5881 would result in total tax of 89%.
130. I.R.C. § 5881(d) (West 1989). This section states: "The tax imposed
by this section shall apply whether or not the gain or other income referred to in
subsection (a) is recognized." Id.
131. Id. § 5881(b)(1). For the pertinent text of this section, see supra note
22.
132. Id. § 5881(b)(2), (c)(1). Section 5881(b)(2) states:
For purposes of this section, the term "greenmail" means any consideration transferred by a corporation (or any person acting in concert
with such corporation) to directly or indirectly acquire stock of such
corporation from any shareholder if(2) at some time during the 2-year period ending on the date of such
acquisition(A) such shareholder,
(B) any person acting in concert with such shareholder, or
(C) any person who is related to such shareholder or person de-
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perception of the greenmail problem as the transient raider.
Mere payment does not constitute greenmail. Rather, section
5881 defines a payment as greenmail only if it is extracted coercively through an actual or threatened tender offer. 13 3 Interestingly, section 5881's definition of a tender offer encompasses
13 4
friendly, as well as hostile, offers.
Finally, a payment constitutes greenmail under section 5881
only if offered selectively. 13 5 This aspect of section 5881 defines
the greenmail problem as the unequal treatment of shareholders. 136 If all shareholders are offered the same terms for the
purchase of their stock, there is no problem of equity and therefore, under section 5881, no greenmail.
Section 5881 spawned at least three interpretive disputes after its adoption in 1987, two of which were addressed in the
Technical and Miscellaneous Revenue Act of 1988.13 7 An issue
arising under section 5881 in its original form was the status of
payments by "white knights," investors embraced by management as an alternative to the unwanted raider. Suppose, for example, that management of a target corporation locates a friendly
investor to purchase the raider's stock at a gain to the raider. In
its initial form, section 5881 did not include the payment from the
white knight to the raider within the definition of greenmail because the payment did not come from the corporation itself. The
Technical and Miscellaneous Revenue Act of 1988 amended secscribed in subparagraph (B), made or threatened to make a public
tender offer for stock of such corporation ....
Id. § 5881(b)(2). Section 5881(c)(1) states: "The term 'public tender offer'
means any offer to purchase or otherwise acquire stock or assets in a corporation
if such offer was or would be required to be filed or registered with any Federal
or State agency regulating securities." Id. § 5881(c)(l).
133. Id. § 5881 (b)(2)(C). For the relevant text of this section, see supra note
132.
134. See I.R.C. § 5881(b)(2), (c) (West 1989).
135. Id. § 5881(b)(3). To avoid the tax imposed by § 5881, a purchase of
stock must be, according to the statute, pursuant to an offer "made on the same
terms to all shareholders." Id. Presumably, this means all shareholders owning
the same class of stock. If, for example, the common stock owned by a raider is
being redeemed, the policies animating § 5881 are satisfied if the same offer is
made to the other common shareholders. It should not be necessary for the
offer to be made to preferred stockholders. However, the literal language of the
statute is susceptible to the interpretation that the offer must be made to the
owners of preferred stock as well.
136. Id.
137. See Dionne, Will the Greenmail Tax Apply to White Knights?, 39 TAX NOTES
1145 (1988); Levin, Greenmail Tax Trapsfor the Unwary, 41 TAX NOTES 229 (1988);
Letter from Robert Willens to the Editor, 39 TAX NOTES 623 (1988) (arguing
that greenmail should not apply to white knights).
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tion 5881 to encompass payments by those "acting in concert"
38
with the target corporation within the definition of greenmail.
This formulation will require the Internal Revenue Service (IRS)
and the courts to determine the level of cooperation necessary for
third parties to be acting concertedly with the target corporation.
Second, concern had been raised as to the applicability of
section 5881 in cases where greenmail is structured as a dividend
for federal income tax purposes. Section 5881 originally defined
greenmail only as "gain," a term which, in the arcana of federal
tax lore, probably excluded payments when structured as dividends under the Internal Revenue Code. The Technical and Miscellaneous Revenue Act of 1988 amended section 5881 to clarify
that its supplemental fifty-percent tax applies to any income received by the greenmailer including payments from the target
39
corporation taking the form of dividends.
Finally, the notion of a "threatened" tender offer has been
criticized as too vague to be workable. One prominent commentator asks of section 5881: "If Carl Icahn has dinner with the
Chairman of Texaco and tells the latter that differences must
either be worked out or he (Icahn) will make a tender offer to
Texaco, is that a threat?"' 40 To make the quandary even more
difficult, suppose the investor with a reputation for hostile takeover efforts does not feel it necessary to articulate his options.
The renowned investor's mere purchase of stock may, without
any explicit statement on his part, be perceived as a threat to
management. Can a potential raider's reputation for takeover activity be enough of a threat to trigger section 5881? Or can it be
said that the proponent of a friendly tender offer has
"threatened" within the meaning of section 5881?
My own sense is that these interpretive problems are not so
difficult or unusual as to make section 5881 unworkable. The federal income tax involves comparable concepts requiring interpretation and development. For example, the Code itself does not
identify which expenses constitute medical care or what outlays
qualify as charitable. While there is always skirmishing between
taxpayers and the IRS at the borderlines of these concepts, the
system on balance works tolerably well. Within a reasonable
138. See Technical and Miscellaneous Revenue Act, Pub. L. No. 100-647,

§ 2004(O)(1)(B), 102 Stat. 3342, 3608 (1988) (codified as amended at I.R.C.
§ 5881 (West 1989)).
139. See id.
140. See Dionne, supra note 137, at 1148.
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time, regulations, rulings and cases can be expected to provide
acceptable guidance as to the contours of section 5881.
Section 280G was, originally added to the Code by the Tax
Reform Act of 1984, and was subsequently revised by the Tax
Reform Act of 1986 and the Technical and Miscellaneous Revenue Act of 1988.141 Section 280G restricts the deductibility of
parachute payments made to certain "disqualified individuals":
corporate officers, shareholders and highly-compensated personnel. 142 This approach casts the golden parachute problem as selfdealing. Under section 280G, payments to rank-and-file employees generally do not constitute nondeductible parachutes, presumably because these employees do not control the corporation
and therefore do not possess the power to self-deal.
To determine if a payment triggers its restrictions, section
280G requires the calculation of the disqualified individual's average annual income from the corporation for the prior five
years.' 43 For purposes of determining this "base amount," taxable fringes are included but tax-free benefits are not.' 44 For example, the base amount includes employer-provided whole life
insurance coverage but omits employer contributions to qualified
pension and profit-sharing plans.
Payments to disqualified individuals trigger the deductibility
restrictions of section 280G if such payments (a) are "in the na141. For background on §§ 280G and 4999, see Dionne, Uncertainty Surrounds Treatment of Golden Parachutes, 40 TAX NOTES 13 (1988); Hood & Benge,
Golden ParachuteAgreements: Reasonable Compensation or Disguised Bribery., 53 UMKC

L. REV. 199 (1985); Johnson, Those "Golden Parachute" Agreements: The Taxman
Cuts the Ripcord, 10 DEL. J. CORP. L. 45 (1985); Johnson, Government Regulation of

Business: Golden ParachutesRevisited, 23 WAKE
A Study in Gold (Les Parachutistes), 15J. CORP.

FOREST L. REV. 121 (1988);
TAX'N 58 (1988); Krueger,

Kaplan,

Opportu-

nities and Pitfalls in Designing Executive Compensation: The Effects of the Golden Parachute Tax Penalties, 63 TAXES 846 (1985); Moore & Schuck, supra note 126; Moore
& Tihon, Golden ParachuteRestrictions Require Planningon Existing, ProposedArrangements, 61 J. TAX'N 324 (1984); Note, Golden Parachutes and Draconian Measures
Aimed at Control: Is Internal Revenue Code Section 280G the ProperMode of Shareholder
Protection?, 54 U. CIN. L. REV. 1293 (1986). Proposed regulations under § 280G

were issued on May 5, 1989. See 54 Fed. Reg. 19,390 (1989) (proposed May 5,
1989).
142. I.R.C. § 280G(c) (West 1989). "Disqualified persons" include both
employees and independent contractors, such as outside directors who are officers, shareholders, or highly-compensated individuals. Id. Under § 280G(c), a
person is deemed highly-compensated if he is among the highest paid one percent of the corporation's personnel or, if he is among the 250 highest paid personnel. Id.
143. See id. § 280G(b)(3), (d). If the disqualified person has worked for the

corporation less than five years, his average annual income is determined for the
time he has worked for the corporation. Id. § 280G(d)(2).
144. Id. § 280G(d)(1)(B).
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ture of compensation," (b) are three or more times the recipient's
base amount and (c) are "contingent" upon a change of control
of the paying corporation. 4 5 This definition formulates the parachute problem as excessive payments triggered by changes of corporate control. If severance payments are made in installments,
they are discounted to present value for the purpose of determining if they exceed three times the disqualified individual's base
amount. 146 For purposes of section 280G, payments of property
are treated at fair market value. 14 7 Payments pursuant to agreements reached within one year before actual changes of corporate
control are presumptively treated as contingent upon the subsequent change of control. 4 8 Section 280G thus indicates that
parachutes established in anticipation of or during takeover fights
are likely to be permeated by management self-dealing.
Section 280G's definition of a parachute payment is subject
to several qualifications. Related corporations are, for purposes
of section 280G, treated as a single employer. 14 9 Qualified pension and profit-sharing plan distributions are excluded from the
definition of a parachute payment.' 50 Payments to disqualified individuals fall outside the ambit of section 280G if they can be
145. Id. § 280G(b)(2)(A). The statute establishes three disjunctive tests for
identifying a change of control. A change "in the ownership" of the corporation
satisfies the statute as does a change of "effective control." Id. As a third alternative, a payment is deemed contingent upon a change of control if such payment is triggered by a change "in the ownership of a substantial portion of the
assets of the corporation." Id.§ 280G(b)(2)(A)(i)(II).
The proposed regulations under § 280G define a change in ownership as
the acquisition by "any one person, or more than one person acting as a group"
of more than 50% of the voting stock of the corporation or of more than 50% of
the fair market value of all of the corporation's stock. 54 Fed. Reg. 19,390,
19,402 (1989) (proposed May 5, 1989).
The proposed regulations create a rebuttable presumption of a change of
control if, within a 12-month period, "one person, or more than one person
acting as a group" acquires at least 20% of a corporation's voting stock. The
proposed regulations also create such a presumption if, within a 12-month period, a majority of the corporation's directors are replaced by persons not endorsed by incumbent management. Id. at 19,402-03.
The proposed regulations define a change of substantial asset ownership as
the acquisition, by a previously unrelated person or group, of one-third or more
of the assets of a corporation. Id. at 19,403.
For all of these tests, the regulations adopt the attribution rules of § 318(a).
Id. at 19,402.
146. I.R.C. § 280G(b)(2)(A)(ii), (d)(4) (West 1989).
147. Id. § 280G(d)(3).
148. Id. § 280G(b)(2)(C). In Sullivan v. Easco Corp., 662 F. Supp. 1396 (D.
Md. 1987), the court held this presumption overcome when the payments were
made prior to the actual change of control.
149. I.R.C. § 280G(d)(5) (West 1989).
150. Id. § 280G(b)(6).
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proven reasonable compensation for services actually performed
or to be performed in the future.' 5' All payments "made pursuant to an agreement which violates any generally enforced securi52
ties laws or regulations" are automatically parachute payments.
Section 280G excludes outlays by certain small businesses
from its coverage.' 5 3 Payments also fall outside the ambit of section 280G if the stock of the paying corporation is not readily
tradeable and if the payments are approved by a three-quarters
54
vote of adequately-informed shareholders.
If a payment triggers the restrictions of section 280G, the excess over the disqualified individual's base amount becomes nondeductible to the paying corporation. 5 5 Under this scheme,
relatively small differentials in severance compensation can produce quite discrepant tax results. Assume, for example, an employee-officer of a publicly-traded corporation earns a base
amount of $100,000. Assume further that a change of corporate
control triggers a severance payment of $299,999 to him. No
amount of this $299,999 represents a distribution from a qualified
plan. Absent a violation of securities laws or regulations, section
280G would not apply since the employee-officer's severance
compensation falls one dollar short of three times his base
amount.
Suppose now the same example with severance compensation of $300,000. Unless it can be demonstrated that $300,000
constitutes reasonable compensation for services, the extra dollar
triggers section 280G. 15 6 Consequently, of the total severance
compensation, only $100,000, the employee-officer's base
amount, is deductible to the corporation. An incremental dollar
of severance payment results in the nondeductibility of $200,000,
the excess over the base amount.
When section 280G applies, section 4999 also imposes a
twenty-percent excise tax upon the disqualified individual, in addition to his regular income tax liability from the parachute pay151. Id. § 280G(b)(4).
152. Id. § 280G(b)(2)(B).
153. Id. § 280G(b)(5)(A)(i).
154. Id. § 280G(b)(5)(A)(ii), (b)(5)(B). For the text of these sections and a
discussion of shareholder approval, see supra notes 46-50 and accompanying
text.
155. I.R.C. § 280G(a), (b)(1) (West 1989).
156. See id. § 280G(b)(2)(A)(ii) ("parachute payment" if compensation
which is contingent on change is three times the base amount).
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ment.1 5 7 To continue our example, the hypothetical employeeofficer receiving $300,000 would, in addition to his normal income tax liability, pay an excise tax under section 4999 of
$40,000 (twenty percent of $200,000).
Given an effective maximum personal income tax rate of
thirty-three percent, 5 8 the combination of regular tax liability
and the section 4999 levy can result in tax of over fifty percent to
the recipient on the excess parachute payment. Given a maximum effective corporate income tax rate of thirty-nine percent,
the cumulative effect of nondeductibility to the corporation, regular income tax to the disqualified individual and section 4999 can
be tax of over ninety percent of the excess parachute payment.
V.

APPLYING TAX POLICY CRITERIA TO SECTIONS 280G,

4999 AND 5881
A.

Overview

Over the years, tax policy analysts have developed numerous
criteria for identifying appropriate tax provisions. Some of these
tests primarily reflect economists' concerns about the impact of
taxes on markets and economic efficiency. Other criteria principally embody the interests of academic lawyers. Some tax policy
criteria are accepted by a broad spectrum of scholars, whereas
other tests do not enjoy such wide acceptance.
I will now canvass these tax policy criteria and apply them to
sections 280G, 4999 and 5881. I conclude that these sections of
the Code satisfy none of the tests for identifying an appropriate
tax provision.
B.

Defining the Tax Base

The most compelling justification for a tax provision is that it
helps define the base of the tax. Every tax allocates the burden of
government in accordance with a particular base, such as retail
sales, real property or net income. Identifying and clarifying that
base is the most fundamental task of the tax law.i 59
157. Id. § 4999(a).
158. This effective rate is applied to income with respect to which the fivepercent surcharge of § l(g) applies.
159. In contemporary tax policy literature, the question of tax base definition most commonly arises in the context of tax expenditure analysis, a perspective premised upon the distinction between normative tax provisions defining
the tax base and statutory measures using the tax system for other purposes.
For an exhaustive treatment of tax expenditures, see S. SURREY & R. MCDANIEL,
TAx EXPENDITURES (1985); see alsoJ. DODGE, THE LOGIC OF TAX 290 (1989). For
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Section 162(a) of the Code, authorizing the deduction of ordinary and necessary trade and business expenses, is a classic case
of a base-defining tax provision. Income is the net increment in
the taxpayer's resources available for consumption and savings.
To yield this net figure, gross receipts must be reduced by the
costs of producing those receipts. Section 162(a) plays a fundamental role in determining the taxpayer's income tax liability,
converting gross receipts into taxable (i.e., net) income, the base
of the tax.
Like most legal concepts, every tax base involves definitional
problems at the margin. For example, is a temporary metal storage shed affixed to the ground real property, subject to tax under
a real estate-based levy, or is it personal in nature, immune from a
real property tax? Much of the Code addresses this type of basedefining problem. Consider an individual's moving expenses
when he changes jobs. Ought these costs be deductible as business-related? Or should such expenses be declared nondeductible as personal outlays? Section 217 addresses this issue by
defining in a fairly objective manner when moving expenses are
deductible in the calculation of taxable income.
It is not always easy to determine if a particular tax measure
is base-defining in nature. Professor Andrews, for example, has
argued that the Code's medical and charitable deductions are
largely base-defining, clarifying the net increase in the taxpayer's
personal resources available for taxation. 60 However, most
scholarly opinion is to the contrary, holding that sections 213 and
170 do not clarify the base of the income tax but erode it by subsidizing charitable gifts and medical outlays.' 6' Similarly, I believe
the Code sections relative to qualified pension and profit-sharing
plans can be viewed as implementing our normative understanding of an income tax. 162 Most commentators disagree, characterizing the qualified plan provisions of current law, not as basedefining, but as a tax subsidy for particular types of retirement
savings. i63
a somewhat different perspective, see Zelinsky, Efficiency and Income Taxes: The
Rehabilitation of Tax Incentives, 64 TEX. L. REV. 973 (1986) [hereinafter Efficiency];
and Zelinsky, The Deductibility of State and Local Taxes: Income Measurement, Tax Expenditures and Partial,FunctionalDeductibility, 6 AM. J. TAX POL'Y 9 (1987).
160. Andrews, Personal Deductions in an Ideal Income Tax, 86 HARV. L. REV.
309 (1972).
161. See id at 310 nn.2-3.
162. Zelinsky, The Tax Treatment of Qualified Plans: A Classic Defense of the Status Quo, 66 N.C.L. REV. 315 (1988).
163. See id. at 315, 322-26.
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Whatever disagreements exist as to the characterization of
particular provisions, there is no doubt that a tax law must contain the measures appropriate to define the tax base. Can sections 280G, 4999 and 5881 be justified as base-defining
provisions which assist in the proper determination of net income? The answer is no. Those who drafted and sponsored
these sections intended not to define income more precisely, but
to regulate corporate behavior. 164 The accompanying committee
reports indicate that sections 280G, 4999 and 5881 were intended
to curtail perceived abuses of corporate management, not to clarify the concept of income. 165
The text and structure of section 5881 confirm that it was not
added to the Code to refine the notion of income. Section 5881
operates completely independently of the income tax base.
Greenmail payments excludable from gross income are nevertheless subject to the fifty-percent tax of section 5881. Section 5881
leaves unaffected, and operates apart from, the Code's definition
of income.
Even if viewed as part of the income tax, section 5881 is too
underinclusive to be considered a reasonable base-defining measure. Section 5881 operates in highly limited circumstances, selective payments to short-term investors associated with tender
offers. 166 There is no problem of income definition in this setting
which would not also exist in the case of payments to long-term
shareholders or to investors who threaten proxy fights, situations
not covered by section 5881.
Section 4999 also fails muster as an exercise in tax base definition. Section 4999 does not purport to include parachute payments within income or to otherwise clarify the reach of the
income tax. 16 7 Parachute payments are already taxable under section 61 which includes compensatory receipts within income. 68
Section 4999, therefore, operates independently of, and leaves
unaffected, the rules for defining taxable income in the Code.
164. See H.R. REP. No. 100-391(11), 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 1086, reprinted in
1987 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 2313-701.
165. Id. ("The committee believes that corporate acquisitions that lack the
consent of the acquired corporation are detrimental to the general economy
.... The committee therefore believes it is appropriate.., to remove tax incentives for corporate acquisitions ....
[and] create tax disincentives for such
acquisitions.").
166. I.R.C. § 5881 (West 1989). For relevant text of this section, see supra
note 132.
167. I.R.C. § 4999 (West 1989).
168. Id. § 61(a)(l).
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Section 4999 is also too narrow in scope to be taken seriously
as an exercise in tax base definition. Section 4999 applies in very
limited circumstances, such as when disqualified individuals receive control-related severance payments equalling or exceeding
three times their respective base amounts. 169 This highly-focused
formula is not responsive to any apparent problem regarding the
definition of income.
Of the three Code sections, section 280G is most plausibly
defended as base-defining because it is part of the structure of the
income tax. Arguably, section 280G might be justified as an evidentiary measure, augmenting the Code's deduction for reasonable compensation through a rebuttal presumption that certain
payments are nondeductible. From this perspective, payments
triggering the mechanical definition of a parachute under section
280G(b)(2) are thereby classified as suspect. Section 280G(b)(4)
then permits a taxpayer to rebut this presumption and prove the
reasonability of such payments. Section 280G, under this theory,
is an evidentiary adjunct to the normal income tax rules of section
162.
Ultimately, this characterization of section 280G is unpersuasive. There are no unusual difficulties applying the Code's general rules in the Code about unreasonable compensation to
parachute payments. In the case of the typical golden parachute,
it is easy to find the normal indicia of nondeductible compensation under section 162. The parachute payee experiences a dramatic increase in compensation from his employer while ceasing
to perform services for it. This is a classic situation in which the
regular rules under section 162 adequately identify unreasonable
compensation. It is not clear why these rules would require augmentation in the form of section 280G.
Moreover, as a provision addressing the issue of unreasonable compensation, section 280G is seriously underinclusive as to
the circumstances in which it operates and to the persons with
reference to whom itoperates. Section 280G is triggered only if a
severance payment "is contingent" upon a change of control of
the paying corporation.1 70 Moreover, section 280G only operates
with reference to the highest corporate elite. These contours are
169. Id. § 4999. Section 4999(b) refers to § 280G(b) for its definition of
"excess parachute payment." Id.
170. Id. § 280G(b)(2)(A)(i). For the relevant text of this section, see supra
note 44.
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evidently responsive to a definition of the parachute problem as
management self-dealing in takeover settings.
However, these provisions make no sense if section 280G is
part of the normal unreasonable compensation rules. If it is difficult to apply section 162 to severance payments, that is the case
whether or not the payments are triggered by a change of control
and whether or not the payments are to disqualified individuals.
Section 280G excludes from its ambit parachute payments by
many, if not most, closely-held corporations.' 7 1 However, the
reasonable compensation problem has traditionally been consid17 2
ered worst in that context.
The contours of section 280G correspond to a definition of
the parachute problem as a matter of management self-dealing in
the takeover of publicly-held companies. Those contours do not
correspond to any apparent problem in implementing the normal
prohibition on the deductibility of unreasonable compensation.
To summarize, sections 280G, 4999 and 5881 cannot bejustified as provisions which define the income tax base. Rather than
refining the notion of income, these measures evidently constitute
penalties for engaging in corporate behavior Congress sought to
restrict.
C.

Taxes and Externalities

There is broad agreement that taxes may be used properly to
correct the market failure resulting from externalities, benefits
and costs affecting third parties. 173 Economic decision makers
typically ignore the effects of their transactions on bystanders.
Therefore, they produce or consume more or less than is appropriate considering the welfare of those bystanders.
In some cases, third parties may bargain with decision makers to reduce or increase externalities. A homeowner, for example, may subsidize the cost of painting his neighbor's adjacent
171. I.R.C. § 280G(b)(5) (West 1989). For the text of this section, see supra
note 49.
172. See Vagts, Challenges to Executive Compensation: For the Markets or the
Courts?, 8J. CORP. L. 231, 257 (1983); see also Pomp, Reforming a State Corporate
Income Tax, 51 ALB. L. REV. 375, 413 (1987).
173. There is substantial literature exploring in depth the concept of externalities. See, e.g., E. BROWNING &J. BROWNING, PUBLIC FINANCE AND THE PRICE
SYSTEM

34 (3d ed. 1987); D. HYMAN, PUBLIC FINANCE 82 (2d ed. 1987); H. Ro124 (2d ed. 1988); J. STIGLITZ, ECONOMICS OF THE PUBLIC

SEN, PUBLIC FINANCE
SECTOR 87 (1986); see

alsoJ. DODGE, supra note 159, at 291;Johnson, An Appealfor
the 'Liberal' Use of Law and Economics: The Liberals Fight Back (Book Review), 67
TEX. L. REV. 659, 666 (1989).

https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol35/iss1/2

34

Zelinsky: Greenmail, Golden Parachutes and the Internal Revenue Code: A Tax

1990]

TAx POLICY CRITIQUE

house if that painting will enhance the value of the homeowner's
own property.
Frequently, however, there are too many persons creating
and receiving externalities for bargaining to occur efficiently. In a
crowded area with numerous houses, hundreds of bilateral bargains would be required if each homeowner were to compensate
for the painting of all the properties whose conditions affect his
own. Some homeowners would choose to freeload, neither painting their own homes nor compensating their neighbors, but still
benefitting from the improvement in property values caused by
others.
In such a setting, collective action becomes more efficient
than bargaining over externalities. Instead of myriad bilateral
transactions among homeowners, the city might pass an ordinance establishing minimum standards for the outside appearance of houses. Alternatively, the municipality might subsidize
the expense of painting from public funds or impose a tax on
buildings not properly painted. This last possibility suggests the
174
propriety of externality-related taxes.
The classic case of a tax-reducing externality is the effluent
charge, a levy on pollution above prescribed levels. Suppose a
river can naturally absorb 1,000 gallons of discharge a day while
ten factories pour into the river a daily total of 1,500 gallons.
One response might be a law mandating the adoption of particular technologies to reduce discharge to the level the river can absorb. An alternate approach is to require the reduction of
pollution while permitting each factory to select the means most
appropriate for it. To implement such an approach, a tax could
be assessed on each factory for discharge in excess of 100 gallons
per day. If the tax is set at the proper rate, each factory will reduce its discharge to 100 gallons daily, the amount corresponding
to the river's natural capacity.
The notion of externality-mitigating taxes has not been with174. Much of the literature about law and economics is devoted to issues
related to bargaining over externalities. See W. HIRSCH, LAW AND ECONOMICS:
AN INTRODUCTORY ANALYSIS 14 (2d ed. 1988) ("[A]n externality exists whenever
the decision of such economic actors . . . affects, through nonmarket transactions, the utility or production functions of other economic actors."); N.
MERCURO & T. RYAN, LAW, ECONOMICS AND PUBLIC POLICY 43 (1984) ("In analyzing the manner in which law and economics interact, it is necessary to study
the problem of externality."); R. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 232 (3d
ed. 1986) ("[Tjhe most dramatic function of the common law is to correct externalities ....").
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Some have suggested that the identification of

third-party benefit and harm is too subjective a guide for public
policy. 176 Norman Ture, for example, has argued that, in the debate about liquor and cigarette taxes, the concept of externalities
has been stretched unacceptably so as to label social, rather than
177
private, virtually all costs associated with alcohol and tobacco.
Others have argued that it is frequently impractical to identify the
tax rate necessary to cause economic actors to abate the externali-

ties they are causing. 178
Despite these criticisms, the notion of externalities is central
to contemporary microeconomic theory while the concept of externality-abating taxes holds an important place in current tax
policy analysis. The issue arises: Can sections 280G, 4999 and
5881 be justified on the grounds that they mitigate negative externalities?

I think not. In the first instance, some believe that

greenmail generates positive externalities, such as the disciplining
of corporate managers chastened by the experience of their colleagues. From this perspective, the market does not produce too
much greenmail but too little. Corporate raiders, when determining to invest their resources in the identification of undervalued
firms, will not calculate these broader beneficial effects from their

takeover activity. Section 5881 is thus perverse, penalizing raiders for the creation of third-party benefits in the form of en175. Ture, Social Policy and Excise Taxes, 40 TAX NOTES 737, 740 (1988)
("Any tax increase should have the broadest possible reach in the population,
and its burden should be clearly identifiable by those paying the additional
taxes. Taxes that are paid only by some of us or are hidden from us cannot
effectively perform the basic function of taxes-to price out government services
and activities.").
176. Id. at 738. The author noted:
[T]he argument that excises on tobacco products and alcoholic beverages are consistent with the social goal of reducing the consumption of
these items in order to reduce the health hazards and social costs they
impose . . . depends, clearly, on whether public policy should be concerned with smoking and the consumption of alcoholic beverages,
which, in turn, depends on showing that the production, sale, or consumption of these products imposes costs on others. It also depends
on demonstrating that imposing excises on the production or sale of
these products effectively addresses the alleged social cost problem.
Id.
177. Id. ("The lost time at work, the lost pay, the lost vacation time, the
higher medical bills, if any, are costs the smoker bears; they are not costs for
society.").
178. Id. at 739. On the subject of raising the gasoline excise tax, the author
noted: "It challenges credulity that the tax-writing public policymakers have
better information for producers and consumers to rely on in their respective
decision making than is provided by the extremely efficient and sophisticated
private petroleum market." Id.
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hanced management performance throughout the economy.
From this vantage, greenmail-producing activity is like house
painting, to be encouraged, and not like pollution, to be abated.
A positive view of golden parachutes also suggests that such arrangements should be promoted or at least left untouched by the
tax law, not discouraged through extra taxation.
From a hostile view of greenmail and golden parachutes,
there is also no persuasive externalities defense of sections 280G,
4999 and 5881. The asserted harm to shareholders from greenmail and parachute payments is the alleged waste of corporate
assets. It is difficult to characterize these costs as externalitiesharm imposed upon third-party bystanders. Shareholders ultimately control the corporation. If shareholders do not want
greenmail or parachute payments made with their money, the
shareholders can prevent it by removing management or forbidding greenmail and parachute arrangements via charter amendments. The asserted costs of greenmail and parachute payments
are controllable by the shareholders, not imposed on them as
helpless third parties.
One perspective on the modern business enterprise dismisses as naive the notion that shareholders in fact control the
corporation they own and nominally govern.' 79 Asserting control
of a widely-held corporation is expensive, for it requires uncoordinated stockowners to organize themselves and communicate
with one another. For most shareholders the effort will not justify
the expense. The net result, according to this argument, is management effectively unfettered from shareholder control.
From this vantage, greenmail and parachute payments are
properly viewed as externalities: costs imposed by autonomous
corporate management upon uncoordinated, essentially helpless
third parties, the shareholders. Since it is not efficient for shareholders to organize to discipline management, collective action
like a housing ordinance or a pollution tax becomes necessary.
Sections 280G, 4999 and 5881 represent the result of such action.
This defense of sections 280G, 4999 and 5881, however, ultimately fails for two reasons. The first is the existence of large
institutional shareholders who take their legal rights of control
179. See Coffee, supra note 89, at 75-76. Recent thought "has rejected the
view of the firm as 'owned' by the shareholders in favor of a view that conceives
of the firm as an equilibrium position achieved as the result of bargaining among
the various participants, including managers, shareholders, and creditors." Id.
at 76 (footnote omitted).
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seriously. The benefits for most individual investors may be insufficient to justify a proxy fight against greenmail-paying management or for a charter change outlawing golden parachutes.
The stakes for institutional shareholders, however, are much
larger. Given the magnitude of their holdings, a few pension
plans or foundations can readily invoke the proxy system in an
effort to stop greenmail and parachute payments. Institutional
shareholders do not need Congress to coordinate their efforts or
to act on their behalf. The threat of institutional shareholders to
sell their stock can also have a sobering effect on management.
Consider, for example, the furor arising from the redemption
by General Motors of its stock owned by H. Ross Perot.' 80 Dissatisfied institutional shareholders did not need Congress to defend
their interests. Within days, the president of General Motors was
8
explaining the redemption to the institutions owning its stock.' '
Whether or not the institutions were correct to accept his explanation, General Motors management took its large stockholders
2
seriously indeed. 18
Second, if greenmail and parachute payments are viewed
properly as costs imposed by uncontrolled management upon
helpless shareholders, sections 280G, 4999 and 5881 are too underinclusive to remedy the problem. Section 5881 does not apply
when the greenmail recipient has held his stock for more than
twenty-four months. Why do shareholders need Congress' protection from management when stock is redeemed from shortterm, but not long-term, shareholders? Section 5881 is only operative if the recipient of greenmail has, directly or indirectly, par8
ticipated in a tender offer or threatened such an offer.1 3 If
management can inflict costs upon shareholders with impunity,
this restriction makes no sense. Should not Congress also protect
shareholders when the greenmailer threatens a proxy fight, or if
the greenmail recipient has made no threat at all, but is nonethe180. Castro, Peacefora Price at GM, TIME, Dec. 15, 1986, at 50, 51; Gelman,
GM Boots Perot, NEWSWEEK, Dec. 15, 1986, at 56, 57.
181. N.Y. Times, Dec. 18, 1986, at D5, col. 1; Wall St.J., Dec. 18, 1986, at
7, col. 1.
High-ranking General Motors Corp. officials defended their buyout of H.
Ross Perot before a meeting of institutional investors who were loudly critical,
partly because GM's chairman, Roger B. Smith, failed to meet them as planned.
But Mr. Smith quickly agreed to a future meeting with the Council of Institutional Investors because, as a spokesman said, "we have a lot of respect for this
group." Wall St. J., Dec. 18, 1986, at 7, col. 1.
182. N.Y. Times, Dec. 18, 1986, at D5, col. 1; Wall St.J., Dec. 18, 1986, at
7, col. 1.
183. See supra note 132.
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less redeemed for management's self-interested sense of security?
Section 280G applies only when excess severance compensation
is paid in connection with a change of corporate control. 8 4 Why
do shareholders need protection from management in the case of
such severance payments, but not when severance compensation
is unrelated to a change of control?
In short, viewing shareholders as helpless victims of management proves too much. If excessive redemptions and severance
payments are costs imposed by irresponsible management upon
powerless stockowners, there is no reason for Congress to limit
its concern to the highly-specific situations identified in sections
280G, 4999 and 5881.
A final externalities-based defense of section 5881 views
greenmail as imposing third-party costs not on the shareholders
of the paying corporation, but on other participants in the economy. Greenmail, the argument asserts, causes corporations to
borrow excessively or to dispose of assets improvidently.18 5
While shareholders of the greenmail-paying corporation can protect themselves, the dislocation from greenmail injures third parties who are without control over the decision to pay
greenmail.' 8 6 Such third parties potentially include customers,
suppliers and employees of the greenmail-paying corporation and
the communities in which the corporation is located. Therefore,
section 5881 is needed to protect these helpless third parties
from the disruptive effects of greenmail.1 8 7
One perspective views corporate "dislocation" as often bene184. For a discussion of § 280G, see supra notes 142-56 and accompanying
text.
185. See Note, supra note 13, at 1049 & n.18; see also Easterbrook & Fischel,
The Proper Role of a Target's Management in Responding to a Tender Offer, 94 HARV. L.
REV. 1161, 1175 (1981); Macey & McChesney, supra note 13, at 32-33 & n.75.
Yet whenever management faces the threat of a takover, it is likely to divest itself
of the cash or assets desired by the bidder. See Coffee, Regulating the Market for
Corporate Control. A CriticalAssessment of the Tender Offer's Role in Corporate Governance, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 1145, 1242-43 & n.299 (1984).
186. McGee, Mergers and Acquisitions: An Economic and Legal Analysis, 22'
CREIGHTON L. REV. 665, 675 (1989). "Consumers are ...
harmed because
blocking a takeover (through the use of greenmail payments) prevents the new
owners from using the acquired assets more efficiently, which would lead to
higher quality products or services at lower prices." Id. But see Easterbrook &
Fischel, suprii note 185, at 1190-91. The duty of the director of a target company
is to operate efficiently and maximize the return to shareholders. See id. at 1191.
In light of this duty, some scholars question whether the director has any duty to
consider the interest of such non-investor groups as employees, customers,
creditors and the community as a whole. See id. at 1190.
187. Externalities of this sort have recently become a topic of interest to
legal scholars. See, e.g., Macey, supra note 51.

Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1990

39

Villanova Law Review, Vol. 35, Iss. 1 [1990], Art. 2
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 35: p. 131

ficial for the economy. Some observers maintain that disposition
of corporate assets can lead those assets into the hands of more
productive owners and managers.1 8 8 Debt can lead to more efficient operation of a corporation, pressuring management to
achieve economies in order to pay interest. 89
From a less benign view of corporate dislocation, the terms
of section 5881 are seriously underinclusive and may actually exacerbate the disruption associated with corporate takeovers. If
Congress' concern is the impact of takeover activity on third parties, such as the communities in which corporate facilities are located, there is no reason for Congress to limit its attention to the
dislocation caused by greenmail. On the contrary, greenmail may
be viewed as among the least disruptive of the possible outcomes
of a takeover struggle. Far more likely to affect third parties are
takeovers which are consummated.
Greenmail leaves existing management in power and thereby
protects to a degree the decisions and policies of incumbent management. On the other hand, the raider, if he assumes control of
the target corporation, has no commitment to the target's status
quo. Rather, the raider has mounted a raid premised on the need
to alter the practices of current management. Greenmail probably carries less potential for disruptive effects upon third parties
than does permitting the raider to take control and implement his
pledge to reorient the target corporation.
Moreover, section 5881 condones, and perhaps encourages,
the redemption potentially causing the greatest dislocation-a redemption available to all shareholders. Such a redemption carries the largest potential for dislocation because in such a setting,
the corporation must borrow or expend, not just enough to satiate the raider, but additional funds to redeem other stockowners
as well. Section 5881 might cause a corporation to broaden its
redemption to all stockholders to avoid the greenmail tax. Section 5881 is thus an irrational response if the concern is the dislocating effects of greenmail upon third parties.
In sum, section 5881 is, at a minimum, a seriously underinclusive response to the dislocation caused by corporate takeovers,
188. See Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 185, at 1182-92. Some commentators argue that moving productive assets to higher-valued uses and to the
hands of better managers benefits society. See id. at 1182. This dislocation of
assets is socially desirable because it occurs in an active takeover market, which
"simultaneously provides an incentive to all corporate managers to operate efficiently and a mechanism for displacing inefficient managers." Id. at 1184.
189. See id. at 1182-92.
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a penalty tax on one of the least disruptive outcomes of a takeover
fight-greenmail. Section 5881, by discouraging greenmail, may
cause raids to be consummated which otherwise would not. Section 5881 may thus increase the extent of takeover-caused dislocation for third parties since a completed takeover generally
carries greater disruptive potential than greenmail.
To summarize, the notions of externalities and of externalitymitigating taxes do not justify sections 280G, 4999 and 5881. For
some analysts, the third-party effects from greenmail and parachute payments are beneficial, not harmful. This view would lead
to the subsidization of greenmail and parachute payments, not to
their abatement through taxation. One can take a dimmer view of
greenmail and parachute arrangements but deny that their costs
are externalities, beyond the control of the affected shareholders.
Even if the costs of greenmail and parachutes are appropriately
characterized as externalities, the terms of sections 280G, 4999
and 5881 are not responsive to any reasonably defined concern.
D.

Taxes as Economically Neutral Revenue Raisers

Microeconomic theory suggests that governments should be
financed by taxing activities with respect to which demand or supply (or both) is relatively insensitive to price. Financing government in this fashion does minimal damage to the pre-tax choices
of consumers and producers, and minimizes the economic disruption of taxation.190
Suppose a government is considering the taxation of two activities. In one activity, as illustrated in figure one, consumer demand is relatively insensitive to price. As to the other, illustrated
in figure two, demand is quite elastic, that is, it is responsive to
changes in price. Before the imposition of the tax, the market
yields quantity QIA of the first service or good at price PIA while,
in the second market, prevailing pre-tax price and quantity are
P2A and Q2A, respectively.
Consider a possible tax on the activity with inelastic demand.
Suppose that, for each unit sold, producers must pay a tax of T.
Supply conditions in the industry will adjust, reflecting this additional cost on producers. After the tax has been levied, the price
190. See D. HYMAN, supra note 173, at 336; R. MUSGRAVE & P. MUSGRAVE,
PUBLIC FINANCE IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 289-312 (4th ed. 1984); H. ROSEN,
supra note 173, at 291; Rudnick, Corporate Tax Integration: Liquidity of Investment,
42 TAX NOTES 1107, 1122 (1989) (discussing optimal tax principle "which suggests that there will not be a social welfare loss to the extent that a tax is applied
on an inelastic quantity").
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PRE-TAX SUPPLY AND DEMAND SCHEDULES
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in the market will rise substantially, from PIA to P1B, while the
quantity purchased and produced will decrease minimally, from
Q1A to Q1B. This phenomenon is illustrated in figure three.
This result is not surprising. With respect to this first activity, demand is relatively insensitive to price. Producers can markup their prices by most of the tax with little loss of sales. Government revenues would be represented by the area NI-O1-P1AP1B.
The story's ending, however, is not perfect. Some (relatively
few) consumers will be deterred from purchasing this first activity
as a result of the tax-based increase in price. They will move the
resources measured by the area O1-MI-QIA-QIB to other sectors of the economy. By definition, those alternatives are less attractive to the consumers than the activity out of which the
consumers have been taxed. Had those alternatives been preferable to the now-taxed activity, the resources denoted by the area
O1-MI-QIA-QIB would have been devoted to those alternatives
in the first place.
The tax will have induced a few consumers to move resources
suboptimally, to goods and services which (but for the tax) the
consumers did not want. The resulting decrease in welfare, denoted deadweight loss, is reflected by the relatively small area N1O 1-M 1. The area N 1-O 1-M I is fairly compact because, under the
assumption of demand inelasticity, few resources have been
shifted as a result of the tax.
This outcome contrasts with the result from a tax imposed on
the elastically-demanded activity. Here, tax of T results in major
disruption, because demand is highly responsive to price. This
result is depicted in figure four. The post-tax price, P2B, will embody only a small portion of the tax. Given the sensitivity of consumers to price, producers cannot pass on the tax without
substantial loss of sales. With producers absorbing most of the
tax, output will contract considerably, from Q2A to Q2B. The
relatively small tax-induced increase in price will nevertheless deter price-sensitive consumers. Tax revenues, represented by the
area P2B-P2A-02-N2, will be disappointing because of the selfdefeating nature of the tax. The tax will significantly reduce the
economic activity from which the government is trying to raise
revenue. Substantial resources, denoted by the area 02-M2Q2A-Q2B, will be diverted from the now-taxed activity to the previously less-desired sectors of the economy as price-sensitive con-
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sumers respond to the tax-based price increase. The resulting
deadweight loss will be measured by the area N2-02-M2.
The area N 1-0 1-M I in figure three is much smaller than the
area N2-02-M2 in figure four. Therein lies the economic argument for taxing the first activity and not the second: taxing an
inelastically demanded activity causes less economic disruption
because fewer resources are moved to less attractive sectors of the
economy. Indeed, the welfare loss represented by the area N202-M2 may be only the first stage in the disruption of the economy. Because revenues P2B-P2A-02-N2 are disappointing, the
government might either tax a third activity, causing further dislocation, or increase the tax rate from T to TI. That increase,
however, will exacerbate the decline of the second activity and
will force even more resources into less desired goods and
services.
Microeconomic theory thus suggests that, with all factors being equal, governments seeking revenue should tax those activities with demand or supply (or both) insensitive to price. The socalled "sin" taxes on tobacco and alcohol, as well as gasoline levies, can be justified on these grounds. Because people will
smoke, drink or drive anyway, such taxes can produce significant
revenue with little disruption to the economy.
This perspective provides no support for sections 280G,
4999 and 5881. It is implausible to characterize these provisions
as designed to produce revenue or as producing significant revenue in practice. It is equally implausible to view the activities to
which sections 280G, 4999 and 5881 apply-greenmail and
golden parachutes-as inelastically demanded or supplied.
The drafters of sections 280G, 4999 and 5881 did not intend
them as economically nondisruptive revenue raisers.' 9' The
92
drafters' intent was to stop greenmail and golden parachutes.
The optimal outcome for the sponsors of sections 280G, 4999
and 5881 would be for these provisions to generate no revenue at
all and for them to deter completely all greenmail and parachute
191. See S.

REP. No. 100-445, 100th Cong., 2nd Sess. 394-96, reprinted in
CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 4904-05; H.R. REP. No. 100-391 (II),
100th Cong., 1st Sess. 1086, reprintedin 1987 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS
2313-701; H.R. REP. No. 98-432, 98th Cong., 2nd Sess. 1033, reprinted in 1984
U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 697.
192. See H.R. REP. No. 100-391 (II), 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 1086, reprintedin

1988 U.S.

1987 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 2313-701 ("The committee ... believes
it is appropriate not only to remove tax incentives for corporate acquisitions
[which lack the consent of the acquired corporation], but to create tax disincentives for such acquisitions.").

https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol35/iss1/2

44

Zelinsky: Greenmail, Golden Parachutes and the Internal Revenue Code: A Tax
1990]

TAX POLICY CRITIQUE

payments. In a fundamental sense, sections 280G, 4999 and 5881
were intended to be not economically neutral, but economically
disruptive, diverting resources from greenmail and parachute
payments which otherwise will occur.
It is, in any event, implausible to defend sections 280G, 4999
and 5881 as economically nondisruptive revenue measures. Such
a defense must rest on the unlikely assumption that greenmail
and parachute payments are inelastically supplied or demanded.
However, greenmail and parachute payments are not plausibly
viewed like smoking, drinking or driving, activities which will occur at a fairly steady rate regardless of the burdens placed on
them. A more compelling argument is that the levels of greenmail and parachute payments are greatly influenced by the associated costs, risks and rewards.
Ultimately, the defense of sections 280G, 4999 and 5881 as
revenue raisers assumes that these provisions are ineffectual as
regulatory measures. If (as is more likely) sections 280G, 4999
and 5881 significantly inhibit greenmail and parachute payments,
they do not pass muster as revenue provisions.
Corporations do not supply greenmail automatically but
rather begrudgingly, only when there is no feasible alternative.
There is no relatively fixed quantum of greenmail in the economy
which will inevitably be forthcoming. Greenmail is paid sporadically and only in response to the greatest provocation: the actual
or perceived threat of a takeover. Greenmail, in short, is not logically viewed as an inelastically-supplied good.
Moreover, demand for greenmail appears highly responsive
to the costs, risks and potential rewards of the raider demanding
it. Identifying undervalued companies takes time, effort and
high-paid manpower. The raider must devote substantial sums to
the acquisition of the target corporation's stock. If these sums are
borrowed, the raider must pay interest. If the money used for the
purchase of the target stock belongs to the raider, he must reckon
with the opportunity costs of tying up his own capital. Takeover
efforts can be protracted. Expensive litigation is virtually inevitable. Investment bankers must be paid. If he communicates directly with shareholders of the target, the raider incurs
advertising expenses.
Furthermore, success for the raider is not assured. Even the
best known takeover investors have their failures. Target management may find a white knight, leaving the raider with neither
the prospect of being redeemed nor the opportunity to take over
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the corporation. Management may successfully restructure the
target or engage in other defensive maneuvers, leaving the raider
without a profit. Shareholders may side with management rather
than the raider. The raider's financial backers may lose interest in
a protracted fight with management of the target company.
The defenders and opponents of greenmail agree that raiders undertake their activity not because raiders believe they are
benefiting the economy, but to make a profit. In light of the costs
and risks involved, that profit must be substantial to justify the
enterprise. It is therefore unlikely that raiders are price insensitive, that is, indifferent to the potential return from their efforts.
More plausibly, raiders are shrewd investors who appreciate their
risks and costs and demand commensurate rewards.
This perspective suggests that section 5881 is not an economically neutral revenue raiser focused upon an inelastically-demanded activity. More convincingly, section 5881 represents a
substantial reduction of the raider's potential reward and reduces
demand for takeover activity. By halving the raider's potential after-tax profits, section 5881 will inhibit the raider from undertaking the efforts necessary to demand greenmail.
Alternatively, section 5881 will cause the raider to operate in
a manner skirting the tax. The raider, because of section 5881,
may wage a proxy fight rather than a tender offer. Alternatively,
he may accept greenmail only if available to all shareholders. In
either event, section 5881 does not serve as a plausible revenue
measure.
It is also reasonable to believe that the level of parachute payments is influenced by the associated costs, risks and rewards and
that, therefore, golden parachutes are neither supplied nor demanded inelastically. Managers demanding parachutes do not do
so without risk. Managers can be sued by disgruntled shareholders contending such arrangements violate the legal duties owed
to the shareholders. Even if managers prevail in such litigation,
they may be burdened by legal fees and bad publicity. Paradoxically, the institution of a golden parachute may, by demoralizing
shareholders, precipitate the takeover against which the parachute is intended to protect.
It thus makes most sense to view corporate managers as balancing the risks and rewards in deciding to demand parachutes.
Section 280G increases the expense of a parachute to the corporation and thus heightens the manager's risk as a fiduciary. Section 4999 decreases the benefits of a parachute to the recipient by
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imposing a penalty tax. It is more plausible to assume managers
are sensitive to these tax provisions than to believe they are not.
Under that assumption, sections 280G and 4999 are not economically-neutral revenue measures imposed upon an inelastically-demanded activity, but rather are impediments to the taxed activity,
parachute payments.
Similarly, it is not reasonable to view golden parachutes as
inelastically supplied by the paying corporations. Shareholders
seem in no apparent rush to initiate such arrangements on their
own. Outside directors voting to supply parachutes to management incur potential legal liability for their acts without deriving
any personal benefit. Golden parachutes do not possess the same
aura of inevitability as drinking, driving and smoking.
When they do demand and supply parachutes, many managers and employers will design such parachutes to avoid the penalties of sections 280G and 4999. In such cases, sections 280G and
4999 will not act as revenue raisers because they will not generate
revenue.
In sum, sections 280G, 4999 and 5881 cannot plausibly be
defended by microeconomists' preference for raising revenue
through taxes on economic activities insensitive to the effects of
taxation. Those who drafted these provisions did not intend
them as economically-neutral revenue measures.' 9 3 It is more
plausible to view sections 280G, 4999 and 5881 as discouraging
greenmail and parachute payments rather than as deriving revenues from them.
E.

Excise Taxes and the Protection of Exempt Organizations

Sections 4999 and 5881 take the form of excise taxes-supplemental levies imposed upon greenmail and parachute payments in addition to the regular income taxes generated by those
payments. During the last twenty years, Congress has, with general approval, developed a network of excise levies to protect taxexempt institutions and their assets.' 9 4 While superficially appearing to be like these excise provisions, sections 4999 and 5881
cannot be justified as part of this regulatory network.
Prior to 1969, the Code's only punishment for the abuse of
193. See supra note 191 and accompanying text.
194. Zelinsky, Section 4975 and PTE 77-9: The Causes of Complexity in the Internal Revenue Code, 15 U.C. DAVIs L. REV. 15 (1981) (tracing prohibited transaction
rules from Tax Reform Act of 1969 to their current form).

Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1990

47

Villanova Law Review, Vol. 35, Iss. 1 [1990], Art. 2
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 35: p. 131

tax-exempt institutions was the revocation of exempt status. 9 5 If,
for example, the trustee of a qualified pension trust borrowed
trust assets interest-free, the IRS could seek only one sanctionloss of the trust's exempt status and consequent disqualification
of the pension plan. Similarly, if the manager of a charity diverted charitable assets to build his home, the only punishment
under the Code was the revocation of the charity's tax-exempt
status.
For two reasons, this scheme proved inadequate. First, the
impact of revocation was typically (sometimes exclusively) felt by
innocent third parties. When a pension trust and plan lose qualified status under the Code, plan participants become immediately
taxable on their vested benefits even though the participants do
not yet receive these benefits. 196 In addition, employers may lose
t 97
part or all of their deductions for contributions to the plan.
Yet, the participants and employers may be innocent of any involvement in the incident causing forfeiture of exempt status.
Similarly, loss of a charity's tax exemption leads to disallowance of donors' deductions and to taxation of the charity's income. 19 8 The consequent diminution of the charity's resources
would probably impact upon the recipients of the charity's services. Yet the service recipients typically have no involvement in
the abuse leading to revocation of exempt status. The same is
frequently true of donors who find their contributions nondeductible because of abuses in which the donors did not participate
and of which they were unaware.
The second problem with revocation of exempt status as the
sole sanction was its draconian nature. There was no such thing
as partial forfeiture of tax-exempt status. A relatively slight transgression had to receive the same punishment as more serious
abuses. There was no way for the IRS or the courts to calibrate
the punishment proportionately to the misfeasance.
In 1969, Congress adopted a set of excise taxes protecting
private foundations, the charities deemed most subject to
195. Id. at 7-13 (discussing origins of excise system protecting exempt entities); see also Interview with Milton Cerny, Retiring Technical Advisor to the Assistant Commissioner for Employee Plans and Exempt Organizations, 40 TAX
NOTES 1125, 1126-27 (1988) (discussing current and former structure of Exempt Organizations Technical Division of Internal Revenue Service).
196. I.R.C. § 402(b) (West 1989).
197. Id. § 83(h).

198. Id. §§ 170(c), 501(c)(3).
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abuse. 199 Under these provisions, if certain misfeasances occur,
an excise tax is imposed upon the foundation and the specific person causing the abuse. Loss of exempt status remains the ultimate penalty for the most serious problems.
The excise taxes established in sections 4941, 4944 and 4945
serve three functions. First, they deter the persons who might
abuse private foundations by imposing sanctions directly upon
such persons, as well as on the foundations. Second, the excise
taxes reimburse the Treasury for the Treasury's "loss" when exempt status is misused. The Treasury extended exemption to the
abused foundation on the theory certain standards of conduct
would be satisfied. When those standards are violated, the Treasury is in a contractual sense entitled to a return of its money since
the subsidy of tax exemption was conditioned upon those standards. Third, the excise taxes serve as intermediate penalties so
that the IRS and the courts have usable sanctions for violations
deserving punishment but not the revocation of exempt status.
The excise levies, in short, represent a carefully-tailored solution
to a problem internal to the tax system, the abuse of the favored
status of exempt organizations.
In 1974, Congress adopted a parallel set of excises relative to
qualified plans. While loss of exempt status remains the ultimate
sanction, less serious "prohibited transactions" trigger a penalty
tax paid by the plans and the persons causing those transactions.2 0 0 Comparable rules have also been adopted for trusts pay20 1
ing benefits to victims of black lung disease.
The various excise taxes have been fine-tuned since their
original adoption. On balance, they are working well and enjoy
widespread acceptance.
Sections 4999 and 5881, while superficially appearing like
these levies, cannot be defended as part of the effort to protect
tax-exempt organizations through excise taxes. Most obviously,
greenmail and golden parachutes, as defined in sections 4999 and
5881, do not occur in the context of exempt institutions. The
199. See id. §§ 4941, 4944, 4945. In addition, other excises tax private
foundations engaging in proscribed behavior without imposing penalties on
foundation managers. See, e.g., id. § 4942.
200. Id. § 4975 (tax imposed on persons engaged in prohibited activities).
In addition, Congress has used the excise tax system to deter certain financial
undertakings and failures of qualified plans; see, e.g., id. § 4971 (employer taxed
upon failure to meet minimum funding standards).
201. Id. §§ 4951 (taxes on self dealing), 4952 (taxes imposed upon taxable
expenditures).
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greenmail and parachute problems which these provisions address occur vis-a-vis the quintessential profit-making organization
of modern capitalism, the publicly-traded corporation.
More fundamentally, the greenmail and golden parachute
problems are not similar to the concerns giving rise to the excise
levies regulating exempt organizations. These excises address a
specific problem internal to the tax system-the failure of tax-favored entities to satisfy the standards upon which their exemptions are premised. When the assets of a private foundation, a
black lung trust or a qualified plan are misused, the Treasury is
perceived as one of the victims since its tax subsidy has been
abused. Since the Treasury is viewed as a party harmed and the
harm is a tax law violation, it is logical for the remedy to compensate and be administered by the Treasury via the tax system. The
excise levies effect a repayment to the federal fisc of the tax subsidy erroneously extended on the assumption the subsidized organization would meet its obligations. In the case of abuse of
exempt status, the Code is the most appropriate instrument for
fashioning a remedy since the problem is itself a violation of the
Code.
As to greenmail and parachute arrangements, none of these
considerations apply. Assuming greenmail and parachute payments do pose a problem, it is not a tax problem logically calling
forth a Code-based remedy or the involvement of the Treasury.
The putative victim of greenmail and parachute payments is not
the Treasury, but the shareholder. If anyone deserves compensation, it is the shareholder, not the federal fisc. Section 4999's
companion provision, section 280G, actually compounds the
harm to shareholders, denying a deduction for parachute payments and thereby increasing the corporation's taxes. There is
no reason, in the greenmail and parachute settings, the Treasury
should benefit in this fashion from the shareholder's misfortune.
If a federal approach to greenmail and parachute payments is appropriate, the federal securities statutes provide an obvious instrument for effectuating that response, making resort to the
Internal Revenue Code unnecessary.
In short, the excise system protecting tax-exempt institutions
is a carefully-tailored response to a problem internal to the tax
system. Such an approach is not compelling when the Treasury is
not the victim and when there are more appropriate instruments
available, such as the federal securities laws, for addressing greenmail and parachute arrangements.
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F.

The Tax System as Efficient Means of Communication

The tax system is an inexpensive means by which the federal
government can communicate its domestic policies. Most businesses and households incur the ongoing costs of complying with
the tax law, such as filing returns and consulting professionals.
Once these inevitable annual expenses are incurred, there are relatively small marginal costs to acquiring additional information
through the tax system. This contrasts with the higher, duplicative expense associated with separate, nontax networks for com20 2
municating federal policies.
Consider, for example, the targeted jobs credit embodied in
sections 38 and 51 of the Code. 20 3 The credit reimburses employers through the tax system for a portion of the wages paid to
newly-hired, economically-disadvantaged employees. 20 4 An employer typically learns about sections 38 and 51 from his accountant or tax lawyer or will discover these provisions himself when
the employer prepares his own return. The employer is, in any
event, incurring the cost of complying with the tax system in the
form of professional fees and the employer's own time and energy. As part of this process and with relatively little additional
cost, the employer can discover the targeted jobs credit through
the employer's tax professionals or through the process of filing a
return.
From the perspective of the federal government, the tax system is an ongoing communications link with taxpayers. Because
202. I have developed these ideas in Efficiency, supra note 159, at 1010. Professor Yorio subsequently criticized my views in Yorio, Equity, Efficiency, and the
Tax Reform Act of 1986, 55 FORDHAM L. REV. 395 (1987). For my response and
Professor Yorio's rejoinder, see Zelinsky, The Tax Reform Act of 1986: A Response
to Professor Yorio and His Vision of the Future of the Internal Revenue Code, 55 FORDHAM
L. REV. 885 (1987), and Yorio, The Future of Tax Reform: A Rejoinder to Professor
Zelinsky, 55 FORDHAM L. REV. 899 (1987). While Professor Zelenak takes a
favorable view of my position, Professor Johnson is decidedly less impressed.
Compare Zelenak, When Good Preferences Go Bad. A Critical Analysis of the Anti-Tax
Shelter Provisions of the Tax Reform Act of 1986, 67 TEX. L. REV. 499,505 (1989) with
Johnson, Why Have Anti-Tax Shelter Legislation? A Response to Professor Zelenak, 67
TEX. L. REV. 591, 601 (1989).
203. I.R.C. § 51(a) (West 1989) (rule for computing amount of targeted
jobs credit); id. § 38(b)(2) (allows for inclusion of targeted jobs credit of § 5 1(a)
in year's business credit).
204. See id. § 5 1(a) which provides: "The amount of the credit allowable by
section 44B [credit for employment of certain new employees] for the taxable
year shall be the sum of(1) 50 percent of the qualified first-year wages for such year, and (2) 25
percent of the qualified second-year wages for such year." The amount generated by this calculation is used in § 38(b) as part of the general business credit.
See id. § 38(b)(2).
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of this pre-existing link, the jobs credit need not include a substantial component reimbursing the employer for his costs in discovering the credit since these costs are minimal for the
employer. Consequently, the credit can be set lower than if it
were necessary to reimburse the employer for significant expense
in discovering the credit.
Consider the likely alternative to sections 38 and 5 1-a direct
expenditure program administered by the Department of Labor.
An employer hiring disadvantaged individuals would submit a report to the Labor Department and receive a reimbursement check
for a portion of the wages paid to these targeted individuals.
How would employers learn of this program? A network of professionals might emerge to inform employers and assist them in
obtaining reimbursement from the Labor Department. This
could result in substantial duplication of cost as the employer, already engaging professionals to comply with the tax system,
would pay a second group of advisors relative to the Department
of Labor.
Perhaps employers would canvass governmental departments on their own and discover programs in which they could
participate. Again, this search process is wasteful of the employer's time and energy since the employer is already communicating with the federal government through the employer's tax
return.
Either way, the nontax alternative must be larger than the
tax-based equivalent. The targeted jobs credit can be set at a
level reflecting the employer's low transactions cost in discovering the credit through the pre-existing tax system. For the same
net impact on the employer's decision to hire disadvantaged persons, the Labor Department's version would have to reimburse
more to offset the employer's larger expense in finding the
program.
The cost advantages of communicating through the pre-existing tax system are clearest as to small businesses and middle
income households. For such persons, the tax system is likely to
be their only continuing legal relationship with the federal government. For small businesses and middle income individuals,
tax advisors are frequently the only professionals with whom
there is ongoing contact. Communication outside the tax system
will require the establishment of duplicate channels.
In contrast, upper income households and large corporations
typically have a greater range of relationships with the govern-
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ment and with legal advisors. Publicly-held corporations have
counsel to monitor compliance with corporate, securities, environmental and other laws. Frequently, large businesses maintain
lobbying offices in Washington to apprise them of new governmental policies and programs. Upper income individuals are
more likely to be engaged in activities requiring the continuous
advice of a wide range of counsel. The cost advantage of communicating through the tax system disappears when there are such
alternative channels of communication through which information can also be obtained at low marginal cost.
Given the intended audience, sections 280G, 4999 and 5881
cannot be justified as the cheapest means of communicating federal policies about greenmail and parachute arrangements.
These sections are aimed at publicly-traded corporations with a
wide array of professional advisers and with numerous links with
the federal government other than the tax system. Section 5881
only applies when the raider has undertaken or threatened a
"public tender offer" requiring filing with appropriate securities
authorities. 20 5 Section 5881 thus applies only to corporations
likely to have securities counsel. Similarly, sections 280G and
4999 apply to larger corporations typically enmeshed in securities
and corporate law issues and thus employing lawyers for an array
of nontax matters. Had Congress' response to greenmail or
golden parachutes utilized the securities statutes, that response
would have been communicated through the securities law network to the intended audience of publicly-held corporations as
quickly and as cheaply as were sections 280G, 4999 and 5881.
In short, there may be efficiencies communicating federal
policies to small businesses through the only consistent link between such businesses and the national government-the pre-existing tax system. There is, however, no such justification for the
use of sections 280G, 4999 and 5881 to regulate publicly-traded
corporations with whom the federal government has existing, alternate forms of relatively inexpensive communications such as
the securities laws.
G. Merit and Demerit Goods
The notion of merit and demerit goods plays a marginal role
in microeconomic theory. A merit good 20 6 is one thought desira205. I.R.C. § 5881(b)(2)(c) (West 1989). For the relevant text of this section, see supra note 132.
206. Merit goods are "[g]oods that the government compels individuals to
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ble for the consumer which the consumer, although properly informed, does not fully appreciate. 20 7 Conversely, ,a demerit good
20 8
is a good harmful to the consumer which he uses anyway.
Merit goods are said to be underutilized by consumers who ignore or discount their benefits while demerit goods are said to be
overconsumed because their harm is minimized or ignored.
It is not surprising that the concept of merit and demerit
goods occupies only a fringe position in formal economic theory.
It suggests that consumers, even with adequate information, do
not know what is good for them. Such a notion does not fit comfortably into the body of economic theory premised on rational,
utility-maximizing consumers capable of enhancing their own
welfare. Indeed, the paternalism inherent in the notion of merit
and demerit goods does not fit well into our broader intellectual
traditions with their emphasis on individual autonomy and
2 09
choice.
While the concept of merit and demerit goods plays a marginal role in formal microeconomic theory, it has in practice had
great influence in particular cases, such as the "sin" taxes on alcohol and tobacco. 2 10 While some support these levies as nondisruptive revenue raisers (people will drink and smoke anyway),
others defend the sin taxes as discouraging people from consuming things bad for them (people will drink and smoke less if the
price increases through taxation). 21 ' The notion of demerit
goods is most plausible with respect to items like alcohol and tobacco which are highly addictive and therefore potentially distort
consumers' normally rational judgment.
consume, like seat belts and elementary education." J. STIGLITZ, supra note 173,
at 92.
207. Id.
208. See R. MUSGRAVE & P. MUSGRAVE, supra note 190, at 78; H. ROSEN,
supra note 173, at 55.
209. See Shapiro, Courts, Legislatures, and Paternalism, 74 VA. L. REV. 519
(1988).
210. See Congressional Roundup: Senate Governmental Affairs Committee Begins
Hearings on Alcohol Consumption, 41 TAX NOTES 119 (1988) [hereinafter Senate]
(Senate Committee hears testimony on effect higher alcohol excise taxes would
have on abuse problem); see also Raising Taxes on Alcohol Would Lower Consumption,
Senate Panel Told, Daily Tax Rep. (BNA) (Sept. 28, 1988) [hereinafter Raising] G1 (reporting same hearing).
211. See Senate, supra note 210, at 119 ("economist ... argued that higher
alcohol excise taxes would probably reduce consumption among alcohol abusers"); Raising, supra note 210, at G-3 (same); Washington Roundup, Coalition Calls
for Higher Alcohol Taxes, 42 TAX NOTES 1277 (1989); Raise Cigarette Prices, Save
Lives, N.Y. Times, Aug. 28, 1989, at A16. For a different perspective, see Cigarette Tax No Factorfor Teen-Agers, N.Y. Times, Oct. 7, 1989, at 22, col. 2.
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Even if some economic activities are properly declared demerit goods and consequently subject to taxation to discourage
their consumption, it is difficult to justify sections 280G, 4999 and
5881 in this fashion. Those defending greenmail and golden
parachutes would deny that they are harmful and therefore deserving of discouragement through taxation.
Even assuming the impropriety of greenmail and parachute
payments, the theory of demerit goods does not convincingly explain sections 280G, 4999 and 5881. To be characterized as a
demerit good, it is not enough that an activity be harmful.
Rather, the harmful nature of the good must also be unappreciated by the informed consumer.
While it may be plausible to so characterize physically-addictive goods, it is unpersuasive to cast greenmail and parachute
payments along these lines. If greenmail and parachute arrangements are disadvantageous to shareholders, that harm should be
clear to shareholders and remediable by them. Greenmail and
parachute payments do not generate the judgment-distorting
equivalent of a nicotine rush. There are no recorded cases in
which shareholders, their judgment clouded by the thrill of paying greenmail, have become addicted to the redemption at a premium of a corporate raider's shares.
In short, the demerit good label does not fit comfortably
upon greenmail and parachute payments. Whatever the validity
of characterizing physically addictive items as demerit goods and
taxing them accordingly, shareholders are capable of exercising
unclouded, utility-maximizing judgment as to greenmail and
golden parachutes. Sections 280G, 4999 and 5881 consequently
cannot be rationalized as abating demerit good consumption.
H.

User Fees

Public finance economists adore user fees. 2 12 In theory and
in practice, a major problem with publicly-provided services is the
regulation and revelation of demand. If the consumer of a governmentally-provided service receives the benefits but pays none
of the costs directly, he has the incentive to demand an almost
infinite level of the service. The consumer of a free service need
not disclose his "true" preference for it-the amount he would
demand were he required to pay for it himself. The result is excess demand for publicly-provided activities.
212. See D. HYMAN, supra note 173, at 327; H.

RosEN, supra note
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The response of most public finance economists to this problem is the user fee, a price assessed by government for the services it offers. With user fees, consumers purchase publiclyprovided activities just as they buy privately-supplied goods and
services. Those desiring less of a public service demand less and
purchase less, while those who want more pay for it.
Obviously, user fees cannot be instituted for most governmentally-supplied activities. It would be impractical to charge
each person for the amount of national defense he desires. On
the other hand, utility and utility-like services are quite conducive
to user fees. As a matter of resource allocation, a public water
company can charge for each gallon just like its privately-owned
counterpart. In the same vein, tolls can be levied on highway
users proportionate to the distance travelled by them.
Sections 280G, 4999 and 5881 cannot be justified as user
fees. Most apparently, these sections are not triggered by the
consumption of a publicly-supplied service but rather by the receipt of payment from a private source, the corporate payment of
greenmail and parachute outlays.
Consequently, a user fee defense of sections 280G, 4999 and
5881 must focus upon the social overhead associated with greenmail and parachute payments. The payers and recipients of such
payments rely on the governmental infrastructure to protect their
transactions. Police and prosecutors defend property. Courts
and legislatures provide legal rules. Sections 280G, 4999 and
5881 might be viewed as reimbursing the federal fisc for these
overhead costs.
There is, however, nothing unusual about the social overhead associated with greenmail and parachute payments which
justifies a unique surcharge for such overhead in addition to
regular income tax liability. As means of allocating the costs of
governmental services, sections 280G, 4999 and 5881 are underinclusive, charging narrowly-defined categories of transactions
while ignoring similar occurrences which place comparable burdens on government-provided activities. Every corporate redemption of stock and every compensatory payment to a
corporate manager takes place against the backdrop of sociallyprovided police, prosecutors and courts. Redemptions triggered
by proxy fights, as well as redemptions of long-term shareholders,
use the same social overhead as the redemptions covered by section 5881. Severance payments to managers are implicitly protected by government-provided activities whether or not such
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payments are related to a change of corporate control and
whether or not such payments exceed three times the recipient's
base amount.
There is thus no reason to believe that greenmail and parachute payments, as defined in sections 280G, 4999 and 5881,
place greater strain on publicly-provided services than similar
transactions for which the Code does not impose a special
surcharge. Because of their underinclusiveness, there is no convincing defense of sections 280G, 4999 and 5881 as user fees
compensating the federal government for services extended.
VI.

THE COSTS OF SECTIONS

280G, 4999 AND 5881

My review of the criteria developed by tax policy analysts
suggests that sections 280G, 4999 and 5881 cannot plausibly be
defended as appropriate additions to the Internal Revenue Code.
As a matter of tax policy, sections 280G, 4999 and 5881 do not fit
comfortably within any recognized doctrine for identifying proper
use of the tax law.
Were matters to end there, sections 280G, 4999 and 5881
might simply be dismissed as inconsequential lapses of Congress'
betterjudgment. Regrettably, sections 280G, 4999 and 5881 cannot be regarded as harmless mistakes because they generate two
significant costs. First, inappropriate tax statutes, like sections
280G, 4999 and 5881, impose burdens on the administration of
the tax law, and divert enforcement resources from other, potentially more pressing areas. Second, the misuse of the Code as exemplified by sections 280G, 4999 and 5881 makes the legislative
process less accountable and less expert. It permits policy to be
fashioned without the substantive congressional committees
charged with responsibility for that policy. Such misuse of the
Code allows Congress to make decisions without open acknowledgment of the nature of those decisions. Such misuse of the
Code also overburdens the tax-writing process making less likely
quality decisions by tax policymakers.
Even if sections 280G, 4999 and 5881 do not as a theoretical
matter belong in the tax law, they must be enforced once placed
in the Code. The Treasury must administer the entire Code, not
just the portions justified as a matter of tax policy.
Enforcement is not costless. Revenue agents must be trained
to understand new provisions of the Code. Audit time must be
devoted to determining if transactions fall within the ambit of sections 280G, 4999 and 5881. Treasury officials must develop reg-
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ulations explicating these new provisions.
Factual and
interpretive disputes will arise between taxpayers and the IRS.
Sometimes litigation will result. Resources will thus be diverted
from the administration of other tax laws to the enforcement of
sections 280G, 4999 and 5881.
This diversion of resources might be tolerable were the condition of federal tax administration currently acceptable. However, no one believes that to be the case.2 13 There is widespread
recognition of serious failure in national tax administration as reflected in uncollected and unreported revenues, unnecessary hostility between taxpayers and the IRS, and difficulties retaining
quality IRS personnel. Much of the impetus behind the Tax Reform Act of 1986 stemmed from a perception of crisis in the federal tax system. In such circumstances, any unnecessary burden
on the Treasury is a serious matter.
Even if Congress recognized the burdens created by sections
280G, 4999 and 5881 and in response appropriated additional
funds for the Treasury, sections 280G, 4999 and 5881 would generate unacceptable costs for federal tax administration. Some resources cannot be increased by appropriation. There is, for
example, only one Commissioner of Internal Revenue. The time
and energy he must divert to the enforcement of sections 280G,
4999 and 5881 is, by definition, irreplaceable.
The misuse of the tax law as exemplified by sections 280G,
4999 and 5881 also makes the legislative process less accountable
and less expert, bypassing the substantive committees of Congress and potentially obscuring the nature of the decisions made
in the guise of revenue statutes. Congress' procedures give its
substantive, nontax committees significant authority within their
respective jurisdictions. This reflects numerous considerations:
the interest in a particular subject congressmen demonstrate by
sitting on committees overseeing that subject; the expertise developed by committee members and their staffs from continued
exposure to matters within their committee assignments; the need
213. See Erekson & Sullivan, A Cross-Section Analysis of IRS Auditing, 41
NAT'L TAXJ. 175, 175 (1988) ("The Internal Revenue Service estimates the 'tax
gap'-the total revenue lost to the U.S. Treasury due to noncompliance with tax
laws-to be about $100 billion in 1986 ....
) (footnote omitted); Gibbs, Tax
Reform: An Opportunityfor a Fresh Start in Tax Administration, 6 AM. J. TAX POL'Y 1,
2-6 (1987) (remarks to American College of Tax Counsel on changes in professional goals and standards at IRS); News, Gibbs, Outlines Challengesfor Tax Administration in 1989, 41 TAX NOTES 1258, 1258 (1988) ("this is a particularly critical
time in tax administration").
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for a 535-member parliament to delegate the initiation of policy
to smaller, more specialized, more accountable groups.
The tax law has become an irresistible vehicle for avoiding
the substantive committees of Congress, the designated legislative channels for initiating policy. Omnibus tax legislation has
virtually become a yearly affair. In the tumult to produce the annual revenue bill, it is possible to attach to tax legislation provisions which could not gain the approval of the appropriate
substantive committees. Once part of a catch-all tax package,
these provisions are not easily dislodged although, by themselves,
2 14
they would not pass congressional muster.
Sections 280G, 4999 and 5881 typify this problem. Congress
has had before it many nontax proposals addressing greenmail
and parachute arrangements. 21 5 None has progressed far in the
legislative process. The strong suspicion arises that, as to greenmail and golden parachutes, omnibus tax legislation has been
used to achieve results unobtainable through more appropriate
legislative channels.
Commentators like Professors Surrey, McDaniel and Yorio
observe that bypassing the substantive committees of Congress
through the tax-writing process results in policy formulated by
tax specialists without the expertise of the members of the substantive committees and their staffs. Policies affecting farmers, in
this view, should be initiated by those knowledgeable about agriculture, not by those whose expertise lies in taxation. Moreover,
using the tax law to avoid the substantive committees of Congress
diminishes accountability in the legislative process and obscures
the nature of the policies formulated through the Internal Revenue Code. In such a setting, responsibility for the initiation of
policy becomes diffused among the tax and substantive committees. Consequently, Congress' processes become less focused. It
becomes necessary to ask: Who is responsible for agricultural
policy-the committees on agriculture or the tax committees?
The answer is not clear.
214. Verdier, Special Report, A Frameworkfor Predicting CongressionalAction, 41
TAX NOTES 435, 438 (1988) ("Congress' increasing penchant for omnibus bills
that must be passed by some deadline provides vehicles for proposals that by
themselves would never make it onto the agenda.").
215. For a discussion of some of the proposed federal legislation, see
Hook, What Is Wrong with Takeover Legislation, 8 N. ILL. U.L. REV. 293, 297-99
(1988) (proposals include: lowering report level from current 5%, providing for
civil penalties when false statements are made in 13D schedules, and extending
period that tender offer must remain open).
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When the tax-writing process is used to avoid the substantive
committees of Congress, issues that should be addressed openly
can easily become obscured because the underlying matter is formulated as a tax question. The federal regulation of greenmail
and golden parachutes raises many issues, such as the merits of
national rather than state standards, the ability vel non of shareholders to protect themselves through their legal control of the
corporation and the desirability of expanding federal regulation
to areas historically covered by state corporate law. Were greenmail and golden parachutes addressed through the appropriate
substantive committees of Congress, these issues would likely be
confronted. However, sections 280G, 4999 and 5881 pretend to
be revenue measures and make it easier for Congress to avoid the
securities and corporate law considerations raised by the federal
regulation of greenmail and parachute arrangements.
Unfortunately, sections 280G, 4999 and 5881 cannot be dismissed as mistakes unlikely to be repeated. For example, some
concerned about leveraged corporate acquisitions suggest that
the federal tax laws be used to police such acquisitions. 2 16 Regrettably, sections 280G, 4999 and 5881 provide precedents for
addressing such matters through the Code although such matters
are better approached through the securities statutes, the anti21 7
trust laws, banking regulations or other nontax vehicles.
216. SeeJOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, FEDERAL INCOME TAX ASPECTS OF CORPORATE FINANCIAL STRUCTURES 3 (Comm. Print 1989) (discussing current dis-

tinctions between tax treatment of debt and equity, and options for lessening
distinction); "Corporate Raider Tax Act of 1989", Daily Tax Rep. (BNA) (Jan. 6,
1989) L-1 (text of H.R. 158 introduced by Rep. Byron Dorgan (D-ND) on Jan. 3,
1989); House and Senate Tax Committees Prepare to Examine Tax Treatment of Leverage
Buyouts, Daily Tax Rep. (BNA) (Dec. 16, 1988) J-1 (same); Jones, Congress, Treasury Thinking over Approaches to Corporate Takeovers, 42 TAX NOTES 144, 145-46
(1989) (discussing LBO issue and solutions Congress might consider); Jones,
Taxwriters Still Mulling Over LBO Question, 42 TAX NOTES 774, 774-76 (1989) (reporting congressional uncertainty over LBO issue and use of tax code as solution); Restructurings, Buy-Outs Cut R & D, Survey Shows, Wall St.J., Feb. 3, 1989, at
A6, col. 3 ("[S]tudy adds ammunition to those who say that the merger-andacquisition wave of the past few years has harmed U.S. competitiveness."); Tax
Changes Sought As Deals Get Bigger, N.Y. Times, Nov. 23, 1988, at Dl, col. 3 (same).
217. I should emphasize that my opposition is to narrowly-targeted, taxbased responses to LBOs along the lines of §§ 280G, 4999 and 5881. Some
commentators suggest that current concern about LBOs should address more
fundamental issues of tax policy, such as the need to more precisely distinguish
debt from equity, and the discrepant treatment under current law between interest and dividend payments. Insofar as concern with LBOs leads to better resolution of some of these basic questions, the tax law would be improved. However,
such fundamental reform is quite different from narrowly-focused provisions
along the lines of § § 280G, 4999 and 5881. For a discussion of such fundamental reform, see Warren, Special Report, Recent Corporate Restructuring and the Corpo-
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Some might defend the circumvention of the substantive
committees of Congress on the grounds that these committees
become captured by special interests (e.g., as to the agriculture
committees, farming interests). In this view, it becomes necessary
to use the tax-writing process to achieve sound policy, free of the
influence of those who have captured the substantive committees.
Sections 280G, 4999 and 5881 might be viewed as providing
plausible support for this perspective. The Senate and House
committees with jurisdiction over greenmail and golden
parachutes have taken no effective action as to these phenomena.
It became necessary, according to this view, to seek redress
through an alternate channel, the tax-writing process.
I find this notion unpersuasive. If there is a problem as to
the capture of the substantive committees of Congress by special
interests, resort to the tax law is at best a temporary solution.
Once interests learn that the tax-writing committees must be controlled to protect their welfare, nothing prevents such interests
from focusing their resources upon that task. The tax-writing
members of Congress are not immune to the blandishments and
threats of special interests. Indeed, some analysts maintain that
218
Congress' tax writers are the prime targets of such attention.
Moreover, one man's evidence of capture is another's proof
of sound public policy. If the substantive committees of Congress
decline to take effective action as to greenmail and parachute payments, that may reflect superior wisdom rather than capture by
those making and receiving such payments. There are respectable arguments against federal action in these areas. Greenmail
and golden parachutes are viewed by some as benign phenomena.
For others, greenmail and parachute arrangements are properly
left to the attention of the state courts and legislatures.
In short, the inaction of the substantive committees may not
reflect the capture of those committees, but the considered opinion of the members of Congress who have thought about greenrate Tax System, 42 TAX NOTES 715 (1989). For a proposal focusing more
narrowly on LBOs, see Thompson, Special Report, A Suggested Approach to
Debt/Equity Issues and Leveraged Acquisitions, 42 TAX NOTES 483, 487 (1989).
218. Doernberg, Special Report, The Market for Tax Reform: Public Painfor Private Gain, 41 TAX NOTES 965, 967 (1988) ("Though members of the tax-writing
committees comprise only 10 percent of Congress, they garnered almost a quarter of the PAC money given in 1985."); Doernberg & McChesney, On the Accelerating Rate and DecreasingDurabilityof Tax Reform, 71 MINN. L. REV. 913,937 (1987)
("[T]he most influential members of the tax-writing committees garner the
greatest contributions [from the political action committees].").
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mail and golden parachutes the most. This characterization
makes resort to the tax-writing process indeed ill-advised.
Misuse of the tax law in the fashion of sections 280G, 4999
and 5881 also overburdens the tax-writing process, diminishing
the likely quality of the decisions by tax policymakers. Those required to be expert in everything are likely to become expert in
nothing. In an environment in which the Internal Revenue Code
is stretched to cover too many concerns, overburdened tax decisionmakers will be able to approach expertly neither the issues
intrinsic to the tax system nor the substantive, nontax matters addressed through the Code.
VII.

THE ISSUE OF PREEMPTION

Let us consider a final defense of sections 280G, 4999 and
5881 potentially advanced by those who are indifferent to the
health of the tax law or who believe such health less important
than confronting greenmail and parachute arrangements. For
these purposes, let us accept that sections 280G, 4999 and 5881
fail all criteria of sound tax policy, that placing inappropriate provisions into the Code improperly diverts administrative resources
from other areas of enforcement and that using the tax-writing
process to bypass Congress' substantive committees makes Congress less accountable and less expert in its actions. Granting all
that, an argument might develop that it still was appropriate to
adopt sections 280G, 4999 and 5881 given the malignant nature
of greenmail and parachute arrangements. The evils associated
with greenmail and parachute payments made necessary whatever
remedy could be adopted, regardless of the costs to the administration of the tax law and to the legislative process.
Those who would so defend sections 280G, 4999 and 5881
should consider the possibility that these provisions will prove,
explicitly or implicitly, preemptive of state law and, in the long
run, inhibit more stringent responses to greenmail and parachute
arrangements at the state level. The boundaries embodied in sections 280G, 4999 and 5881 may come to establish federally-created safe harbors within which greenmail and parachute payments
may be made with impunity. As to payments triggering the penalties of section 280G, 4999 and 5881, those penalties may come to
be viewed as preemptive of state law remedies which would have
compensated shareholders.
Consider, for example, a control-related severance package
equalling 2.95 times an executive's base amount, just short of sec-
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tion 280G's definition of a parachute payment. Suppose further
that disgruntled shareholders challenge this severance arrangement in court alleging self-dealing, waste of corporate assets and
violation of management's fiduciary obligations. The corporation
may plausibly contend that Congress has foreclosed this attack. If
the courts agree that sections 280G and 4999 preempt state law
responses to allegedly golden parachutes, these provisions will
have created a nationwide safe harbor for severance arrangements which the courts, left unimpeded, might have proscribed.
Consider also the possibility of a legislature amending a
state's corporation statute to preclude selective redemptions of
stock unless the redeemed shareholders have owned their shares
for at least thirty months, six months longer than the period described in section 5881. Does section 5881 preempt this amendment of state law?
Preemption issues similarly arise as to transactions covered
by sections 280G, 4999 and 5881. Does, for example, the applicability of section 280G prevent a shareholder's suit as to a
golden parachute? If so, section 280G will hurt shareholders
doubly, increasing the federal taxes of their corporations because
of the nondeductibility of parachute payments while foreclosing
shareholders' state law remedies for redress.
A related preemption concern for greenmail and parachute
opponents should be the differing enforcement priorities of the
IRS and the victimized shareholders. As an institutional litigator,
the IRS may, for tactical reasons, eschew some cases while pursuing others. The IRS may rationally compromise cases involving
sections 280G, 4999 and 5881 when the shareholders (absent
preemption) would utilize their state law remedies. Similarly, the
IRS might reasonably decline to assert liability in situations where
the shareholders will proceed if they are able.
A final preemption concern stems from the inefficacy of denying deductions to corporations which do not have taxable income. It is widely recognized that tax expenditures cannot
readily affect the behavior of persons without taxable income. If,
for example, a corporation has a net operating loss, it obtains no
significant benefit from any extra deductions bestowed by Congress. As Professor Zolt has observed, the converse is true for
some tax penalties: denying a deduction has no serious impact
upon a taxpayer with no taxable income. To a corporation already losing money, it is not a serious sanction to deny deductibility for parachute payments. This raises the ironic possibility that
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section 280G might preempt shareholders' state law remedies,
but not deter loss corporations from extending golden
parachutes since such corporations cannot use the deduction sec21 9
tion 280G denies.
Even if sections 280G, 4999 and 5881 do not explicitly preempt state law responses to greenmail and golden parachutes,
courts might find it persuasive evidence of reasonableness that a
particular arrangement does not trigger a federal penalty tax.
The result could be an implicit, but effective, preemption of more
stringent state responses to greenmail and golden parachutes.
There is evidence this is already happening. In Buckhorn Inc.
v. Ropak Corp.,220 the court found certain parachutes acceptable as
a matter of state law because the parachutes did not trigger section 280G. 22 ' The failure of parachutes to activate the limitations

of section 280G, the court said, "provides some assurance that
the severance payments would be reasonable in the event that
they are exercised." 2 2 2 In Worth v. Huntington Bancshares,2 23 the
court also buttressed its approval of particular golden parachutes
with the observation that the parachutes in question were not
deemed abusive under section 280G. 224 In InternationalInsurance
Co. v. Johns,22 5 the court found section 280G to "be a guiding factor" in determining, as a matter of state law, whether specific par22 6
achute arrangements constituted corporate waste.
219. Zolt, Deterrence Via Taxation: 4 CriticalAnalysis of Tax Penalty Provisions,
37 UCLA L. REV. 343, 354-55 (1989).
220. 656 F. Supp. 209 (S.D. Ohio 1987).
221. Id. at 232. The court noted that in the present case the directors had
"reasonable grounds" to believe that a tender offer would pose a threat to the
company's key employees. Id. In addition, the protective measures were in proportion to the posed threat. Id. Moreover, the payment would only be made to
the managers if they were fired or constructively discharged within 12 months of
the change of control. Id.
222. Id. at 233.
223. No. 52861 (Ohio Ct. App. Nov. 25, 1987) (LEXIS, States library, Ohio
file), aff'd in part, rev'd in parton other grounds, 43 Ohio St. 3d 192, 540 N.E.2d 249
(1989).
224. Id. ("a judicial framework for evaluating the reasonableness of a compensation clause is also provided by the Deficit Reduction Act of 1984"); see also
Comment, Golden Parachutes: Safe Landings in Ohio and Elsewhere, 57 U. CIN. L.
REV. 699 (1988).
225. 874 F.2d 1447 (11 th Cir. 1989). Golden parachute cases are not the
only situations in which a federal tax statute has influenced courts' perceptions
of state corporate law. In Theodora Holding Corp. v. Henderson, 257 A.2d
398, 400 (Del. Ch. 1969), minority shareholders challenged the propriety under
Delaware law of a corporate charitable contribution. In upholding the gift, the
chancery court found it "a helpful guide" that the gift was fully deductible for
federal income tax purposes. Id. at 405.
226. International Insurance, 874 F.2d at 1462 n.30.
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My own judgment is that sections 280G, 4999 and 5881
should not be viewed as preemptive of shareholders' state law
remedies, and that compliance with the boundaries of these provisions should not be taken as evidence of reasonability. Having
been crafted as tax legislation, these provisions should not be
treated as an exhaustive congressional pronouncement as to
greenmail and parachute payments. If Congress wants to make a
comprehensive statement on greenmail and golden parachutes, it
should discipline itself to proceed in a proper fashion, such as
initiating a statute by the appropriate substantive committees of
Congress, or explicitly labelling a tax provision preemptive of
state law.
Professor Macey has argued for a plain meaning approach to
statutes benefitting special interests so as to require legislative explicitness about the arrangement being enacted.2 2 7 Analogously,
the courts should constrain Congress by treating tax statutes as
nothing more than revenue measures unless Congress openly indicates that it is using the tax system to promulgate substantive
policy.
However, my judgment on this score is not beyond cavil.
The courts may plausibly conclude that sections 280G, 4999 and
5881 should be treated as federal corporate law and not be given
credence as mere revenue measures. From this premise, it is a
short step to conclude that sections 280G, 4999 and 5881 preempt more stringent action by the states or, at a minimum, are
relevant to a determination under state law.
It might take years, perhaps decades, for the judicial system
to determine definitively whether sections 280G, 4999 and 5881
have preemptive effect. Prior to a decision of the United States
Supreme Court, various lower courts may rule differently, leaving
some shareholders with state law remedies as to parachute and
greenmail payments, and others without such remedies. This
possibility should give pause to the defenders of sections 280G,
4999 and 5881.
227. Macey, Promoting Public-RegardingLegislation Through Statutory Interpretation: An Interest Group Model, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 223, 227 (1986) ("The traditional approach.., encourages more public-regarding legislation by frequently
transforming statutes designed to benefit narrow interest groups into statutes
that in fact further the public's interest.").
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CONCLUSION

As a matter of tax policy, sections 280G, 4999 and 5881 do

not belong in the Internal Revenue Code. These sections satisfy
none of the criteria for identifying appropriate tax provisions.
The misuse of the tax law as exemplified by sections 280G, 4999
and 5881 imposes unnecessary costs upon the administration of
the tax system. It also makes the legislative process less accountable and less expert.
It is likely that in the years ahead Congress will devote considerable attention to the governance of publicly-held corporations. If it is to legislate in this area, Congress should avoid use of
the Internal Revenue Code in the fashion of sections 280G, 4999
and 5881. Congress could demonstrate respect for the tax system
and for Congress' own processes by repealing these ill-advised
provisions.
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